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CRYSTALS AND MUD IN BANKRUPTCY LAW:
JUDICIAL COMPETENCE AND

STATUTORY DESIGN
Ted Janger"

[C]rystallinerules seem less the king of the efficiency mountain titan
we may normally assume. One can argue that elaborate ex post
allocations of responsibilitiesmight be efficient too, even if they
make people's entitlementsfuzzier em ante. The very knovledge that
one cannot gull someone else, and get away with it, makes it less
likely that anyone will dissipate time and effort in trying to find the
gullible.!

I. INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy reform is on the horizon, and it is largely misguided. While
reform bills in each of the last two legislative sessions may have stalled because of
the inability of the two houses of Congress and the President to agree on the shape
of the final legislation,2 reform efforts will continue.' Legislators and lobbyists,
*
Associate Professor, Brooklyn Law School. J.D. University of Chicago 1987;
B.A. Yale College 1983. The author would like to thank Douglas Baird, Susan Block-Lieb,
Jill Fisch, Dan Keating, Roy Kreitner, Ronald Mann, Nancy Rapoport, Paul Schwartz, Paul
Shupack, Steve Thel, Steven Schwarcz, George Triantis, Elizabeth Warren, and participants
in the Yale/Stanford Junior Faculty Forum and the Fordhan Law School Advanced
Business Law Seminar for helpful comments on earlier drafts. Tally Wiener and Angela
Calcagno provided excellent and essential research assistance, and the Dean's Research
Fund at Brooklyn Law School provided generous financial support. Mistakes are, of course,
mine alone.
1.
Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Laiv, 40 STAN. L. Rev. 577,
600 (1988).
2.
In 1998, H.R. 3150, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, passed the House,
and S. 1301, the bill's counterpart, passed the Senate, but both died when the two houses could
not agree on a conference report. The Republicans then attempted to incorporate a version of
the bill similar to H.R. 3150 into the 1999 appropriations bill, but these efforts failed. See
Philip S. Corwin, Bankruptcy Reform: Another Bill 7hat ill Hold Until Next Year, BANKING
POLICY REPORT, at 1 (Nov. 16, 1998). In 1999 and 2000, a similar story unfolded. H.R. 833
passed the House by a vote of 313-108. See Final Vote Resultsfor Roll Call 115 available at
http://143.231.123.93/cgi-bin/vote.exe?year-1999&rollnumber'115 (visited Apr. 21, 2001).
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distrustful of judges, are seeking to replace muddy, open-ended rules with
crystalline, highly specific statutory provisions that, while difficult to penetrate,
leave little to the imagination. This infatuation with "crystalline" statutory drafting
turns on a misunderstanding of the roles that "muddy" rules, judicial discretion,
and judicial competence play in the bankruptcy statutory scheme. To make matters
worse, much current bankruptcy scholarship appears to share the same
misconception.
Carol Rose, in her seminal article, Crystals and Mud in Property Law,
describes how crystalline statutory drafting increases the likelihood that parties
will be able to resolve disputes through bargaining while muddy statutory drafting
increases the probability that disputes will be resolved by a judge.4 The current
battles royal in both the legislative and scholarly arenas are, each in their own
way, contests over the institutional choice5 between markets and judges, fought
out over crystalline versus muddy rules. Legislators may choose crystalline rules

S. 625 passed the Senate by a vote of 83-14. See U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 106th
Congress-2d Session (2000) available at http:lwww.senate.gov/legislative/vote1062/
vote_00005.html (visited Apr. 21, 2001). A final bill, H.R. 2415, then passed the House of
Representatives by a voice vote on October 12, 2000, and passed the Senate on December
7, 2000, by a vote of 70-28. See Rollcall Vote No. 297 Leg. available at
http://www.abiworld.org/vote.html (visited Apr. 21, 2001). On December 19, 2000, the
President announced his intention to "pocket veto" the bill, and did so. See Legislation to
Overhaul Laws on Bankruptcy Dies As President Fails to Sign It, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 20,
2000, at A32. A new bill, The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
of 2001, recently passed both the House and the Senate and is currently awaiting the
naming of a conference committee. See American Bankruptcy Institute, Today's Headlines
April 11, 2001 available at http://www.abiworld.org/headlines/todayshead.html (visited
Apr. 21, 2001).
3.
The fact that personal bankruptcies were hovering at a rate of just over
1,000,000 per year, while the economy appeared to be booming, created the perception in
Washington that something was amiss. As the pace of the economy increased, so, until
recently, did the number of personal bankruptcy filings, rising from 832,415 in 1995 to
1,389,839 in 1998, and then falling slightly in 1999 to 1,315,751. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF

1999
declined
from 51,042 in 1995 to 38,625 in 1999, see id., the trend appears to have reversed, with
business filings up twenty-six percent for the fiscal year ended March 31, 2000. See Gary
Strauss, Despite Booming Economy, Bankruptcy on Rise, USA TODAY, July 12, 2000, at
B1.
4.
See Rose, supra note I, at 577 ("We draw these ever-sharper lines around
our entitlements so that we know who has what, and so that we can trade instead of getting
into the confusions and disputes that would only escalate as the goods in question became
scarcer and more highly valued."). Rose notes that this insight applies in the world of
commercial law, as well as in the world of real property. Id. at 590 n.73 (citing Douglas
Baird & Thomas Jackson, Information, Uncertainty, and the Transfer of Property, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 299, 312-18 (1984)).

THE UNITED STATES COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS:

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 34 (1999). While business bankruptcy filings

5.

See generallyNEIL KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES (1994).
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to facilitate private resolution of disputes, but they may also choose crystals

because they doubt the competence of judges.6
This distrust of judges is evident in the recent bankruptcy reform efforts7
and in recent bankruptcy scholarship of the "Law and Economics" stripe." These
legislators and scholars use the supposed incompetence of bankruptcy judges as a
principal basis for arguments in favor of limiting the goals of bankruptcy law and
curbing the discretion of bankruptcy judges.9 Indeed, some recent bankruptcy0
scholarship carries this disenchantment with bankruptcy judges even further,
seeking to make bankruptcy law irrelevant by reducing it to a set of contractual
default rules." This Article, without seeking to determine whether such skepticism
6.
See Susan Block-Lieb, Congress' Temptation to Defect: A Political and
Economic Theory of LegislativeResolutions to FinancialCommon Pool Problems,39 Amz.
L. REv. 801, 864-65 (1997) (suggesting that narrowly drafted rules may be attempts by
interest groups to lock in legislative gains).
7.
S. 625 passed the Senate on February 2, 2000, by a vote of 83-14. H.R. 833
passed the house by a vote of 313-108 on May 5, 1999. See supranote 2. These proposed
business bankruptcy reforms would limit the scope of the automatic stay with regard to
certain specific types of property, such as rolling stock, ships, and aircraft (S. 625, 106th
Congress §§ 401,402 (1999)), see infra note 94 and accompanying text, limit the ability of
judges to extend the debtor's exclusivity period (S. 625, 106th Congress § 413 (1999)), see
infra note 92 and accompanying text, and limit the time to confirm a plan in small business
cases (S. 625, 106th Congress § 427 (1999)). See Edward J. Janger, The Locus of Law
Making: Uniform State Law, FederalLaw and Bankruptcy Reform, 74 AM. BANK .J.97,
105 n.45 (2000). Proposed consumer bankruptcy reforms would force certain debtors into
Chapter 13 based on their median income level (S. 625, 106th Congress § 102 (1999)), see
infra notes 204-219, and accompanying text, and render certain credit card debt nondischargeable (S.
625, 106th Congress § 310 (1999)).
8.
See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE
L.L 573, 585-86 (1998).
9.
See, e.g., Christopher NV. Frost, Bantkrupcy RedistributivePolicies and the
Limits of the JudicialProcess, 74 N.C. L. REv. 75, 99 (1995) (arguing that bankruptcy
judges are not institutionally well situated to take community interests into account).
10.
There has been a recent boom in articles proposing contractual alternatives
to bankruptcy law that would eliminate the need for bankruptcy judges entirely. See, e.g.,
Alan Schwartz, A ContractTheory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE UJ. 1807,
1821-22 (1998). For a response to Schwartz, see Lynn M. LoPucki, ContractBankruptcy:
A Reply to Alan Schwartz, 109 YALE L.J. 317 (1999), and for a surreply, see Alan Schwartz,
Bankruptcy ContractingReviewed, 109 YALE L.L 343 (1999).
11.
See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 1839 ('Congress should reject the [National
Bankruptcy Review Commission's] recommendation to prohibit all bankruptcy waivers.");
see also Barry E. Adler, A World Without Debt, 72 WASH U. L.Q. 811, 816-18 (1994)
("[1]n principle, a world without debt or bankruptcy, and with contractual solutions to the
collective action problem, seems an efficient world."); Barry E. Adler, Financial and
Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REv. 311, 313-14
(1993) ("Bankruptcy's solution to the common pool problem, however, rests on a faulty
premise: that there is a common pool problem....In theory, each creditor could appoint
management as its agent to enforce a mutual and irrevocable agreement among creditors to
accept only a collective default remedy."); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The
Untenable Casefor Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.L 1043, 1078-79 (1992) ("Chapter 11 should
be repealed, abolishing court-supervised corporate reorganizations and, in effect, precluding
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about judges is justified, argues that the legislative and scholarly push for more
crystalline rules turns on a misunderstanding of the relevance of judicial
competence to statutory drafting strategies.
Rose's distinction between "mud" and "crystals" mirrors a seemingly
irreducible fault line among bankruptcy scholars.' So-called "proceduralists,"
mostly of the law and economics school, seek an "efficient" bankruptcy statute
and crystalline statutory drafting, while traditional bankruptcy scholars, sometimes
called "traditionalists," 3 eschew economic methods in favor of broader
conceptions of fairness and statutory mud. 4 In a recent article, Douglas Baird
described the divide as turning not just on differing goals for bankruptcy law, but

residual claimants from participating in any reorganization of the firm."); Robert K.
Rasmussen, Debtor'sChoice: A Menu Approach to CorporateBankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV.
51, 53-54 (1992) ("Contrary to the prevailing wisdom, this Article argues that bankruptcy
law should be treated as a default rule.").
12.
As Douglas Baird describes it:
[T]here are two distinct camps. In the first are traditional bankruptcy
lawyers and scholars whose views are largely reflected in the recent
report of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission....The second
group consists almost entirely of academics... .The group's distinctive
characteristic is its focus on procedure and its belief that a coherent
bankruptcy law must recognize how it fits into both the rest of the legal
system and a vibrant market economy.
Baird, supra note 8, at 576 (citations omitted); see also Robert K. Rasmussen, An Essay on
Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and Social Justice, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1994) ("Tile
debate over Chapter 11 reflects a division over which policies bankruptcy should
embrace.").
13.
See Baird, supra note 8, at 576 n.9. Works by scholars that Baird deems
"traditionalist" include: KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING TIlE
BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM (1997); Donald R. Korobkin, RehabilitatingValues: A Jurisprudence
of Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 717 (1991); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U.

CHI. L. REv. 775 (1987); Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Searchingfor
ReorganizationRealities, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1257 (1994).
14.
See Baird, supra note 8, at 576 n. 11.Works by scholars that Baird deems
"proceduralist" include: THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITs OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
(1986); Barry E. Adler, Finance's Theoretical Divide and the Proper Role of Insolvency
Rules, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 1107 (1994); Barry E. Adler, FinancialandPoliticalTheories of
American CorporateBankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1993) [hereinafter Adler, Theories

of American Corporate Bankruptcy]; James W. Bowers, Groping and Coping in the
Shadow of Murphy's Law: Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics of Failure,
88 MICH. L. REV. 2097 (1990); Frank Easterbrook, Is CorporateBankruptcy Efficient?, 27
J. FIN. ECON. 411 (1990); Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of
Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharingand the Creditors'Bargain,75 VA. L. REV.
155 (1989); Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior,and Common Pools, 59 U.
CHI. L. REv. 645 (1992); Randal C. Picker, Voluntary Petitionsand the Creditors'Bargain,
61 U. CN. L. REv. 519 (1992); Robert K. Rasmussen, The Ex ante Effects of Bankruptcy
Reform on Investment Incentives, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1159 (1994); George G. Triantis, A
Theory ofthe Regulation ofDebtor-in-PossessionFinancing,46 VAND. L. REV. 901 (1993);
Michelle J. White, Corporate Bankruptcy As a Filtering Device: Chapter 11
Reorganizationsand Out-of-Court Debt Restructurings, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 268 (1994).
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on fundamentally different visions of the bankruptcy judge." According to this
account, traditionalists seek equity among creditor constituencies. They live in,
and glory in, a world of bankruptcy detail, a paradise where a complex statute and
muddy facts merge to create a happy home for experts, a world of discretion for
bankruptcy judges, and a black hole for everyone else. 6 The proceduralists, by
contrast, favor crystalline statutory drafting to sharply reign in judicial discretion.
They focus solely on maximizing the return to creditors and reducing the cost of
credit. This focus leads some to suggest a radical reconceptualization of
bankruptcy law, generally based on contract principles.' Baird describes the
traditionalist world as a world ofjudicial discretion, and the proceduralist world as
one of statutory precision.'" The traditionalist vision is of a maximalist judge,
imposing his will on the bankruptcy proceeding, while the proceduralist's ideal
judge is a minimalist, adjudicating disputes, if at all, 9 in a manner, harkening back
15.

See infra notes 33-48 and accompanying text.

16.
See Frost, supra note 9, at 75, 91 (offering a critique of the activist
bankruptcy judge). To a large extent, the debate between traditionalists and proceduralists is

a mirror of the broader political debates in the 1980s between the limited government
agenda of the Reagan/Bush Republicans. These debates have shifted somewhat, with a
newer so-called Chicago School emerging that looks at social institutions more broadly. See
Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J.LEGAL STUD. 661, 665 (1998); see also

KoNisAR, supra note 5, at 5 ("Institutional choice is difficult as well as essential. The
choice is always a choice among highly imperfect alternatives."). It may be time for a
similar move in bankruptcy scholarship: time to move from a bipolar world dominated by
one group of scholars who believe markets are perfect and another that view markets as
either severely flawed in the bankruptcy context or as irrelevant. As such, this Article
operates from the perspective that the market with all its imperfections will ultimately drive
the results of a bankruptcy, but that government action, social norms, and personal
idiosyncracies can shape the results of a case, and indeed, can shape the market.
17.
See, e.g., Adler, Theories of American CorporateBankruptcy, supra note 14,
at 323-41; Rasmussen, supra note 14, at 1190-1211; see also LoPucki, supra note 10;
Schwartz, supra note 10.

18.
Baird, supra note 8, at 579-80. Baird, a proceduralist himself, takes, as the
centerpiece for his description of the bankruptcy academy, two competing visions of the
goals of bankruptcy law and the role of the bankruptcy judge. As he describes it:
Mhe traditional bankruptcy experts believe that:
(1) the preservation of firms (and therefore jobs) is an important and
independent goal of bankruptcy; (2) contemplation of the rights and
needs of the parties before the court matters more than the effects on
incentives before the fact; and (3) bankruptcy judges should enjoy broad
discretion to implement bankruptcy's substantive policies.
By contrast, in the proceduralist world:
(1) the preservation of firms is not an independent good in itself; (2) ex
ante effects are important; and (3) the judge, after controlling for the
biases and weaknesses of the parties and resolving the legal disputes,
must allow the parties to make their own decisions and thereby choose
their own destinies.
Id.

19.

Contract bankruptcy proposals like those of Adler, Rasmussen, and Schwartz

would keep most business cases out of bankruptcy court altogether, because the creditors
would have agreed to their treatment in the event of insolvency in advance of giving credit.
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to Lon Fuller, that pays close attention to the perceived limitations of the
adjudicative process and to the perceived limitations of bankruptcy judges 20
These competing visions of the bankruptcy judge are driven by two
competing visions of the paradigmatic bankruptcy case and by differing views of
the ability of bankruptcy judges to distinguish between them. The proceduralists'
bankruptcy case occurs in a world of efficient markets and low transaction costs,
while the traditionalists' debtor exists in a world where prices are sticky, markets
imperfect, and transaction costs are high. The proceduralists' judge is a dupe,
unable to distinguish between cases that are candidates for reorganization and
those which are hopeless. The traditionalists' judge, by contrast, is a hero, working
with the parties to achieve a consensual, collective solution to a common problem.
These competing views of the bankruptcy judge drive two radically different
views of the appropriate goals of the statute and of the proper approach to
statutory drafting.
In this Article, I seek to demonstrate that the proceduralists' reflexive
prescription of crystalline rules, driven by their doubts about judicial competence,
is misguided. In Part 1I, I identify the principal components of the proceduralist
and traditionalist visions. The proceduralists' minimalist vision of the judge
appears to be driven by two principles that I call, respectively, the proceduralist
"should not" and the proceduralist "cannot." On the one hand, proceduralists take
the normative view that any judicial interference in the market "should not" be
redistributive. A court should only intervene if the effect is to make all creditors
better off. On the other hand, proceduralists doubt that bankruptcy judges can
accomplish this task. For institutional reasons, such as lack of information, they
"cannot" distinguish firms with going concern value that can only be preserved
through reorganization from firms that could be more efficiently liquidated
piecemeal.
In Part III, I accept, for the purposes of argument, the proceduralist
"should not,"21 and develop a model of judicial role and statutory drafting based
on the use of statutory mud and statutory crystals which satisfies that constraint. I
argue that the role of the bankruptcy judge, in a world free of the proceduralist

20.
See generally Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92
HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978); see also Frost, supra note 9, at 75, 91.
21.
As would many bankruptcy scholars, who Baird deems "traditionalist," at
least insofar as it applies to the role of judges. While the proceduralists and traditionalists
may differ over whether the Bankruptcy Code should embody redistributive or consumer
protective policies, compare WARREN, supra note 13, at 777 ("1 see bankruptcy as an
attempt to reckon with the debtor's multiple defaults and to distribute the consequences
among a number of different actors."), with Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution,Forum
Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CH. L. REV. 815, 820-21 (1987)
("[I]n a world in which all assertions of ownership are stayed (as they are in bankruptcy),
how much a particular owner gets should have nothing to do with how a firm's assets are
used or whether it stays in business."), few, if any, traditionalist scholars suggest that

bankruptcy judges should go beyond the mandates of the statute to benefit particular types
of creditors at the expense of others.
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presumptions about bankruptcy cases and judicial competence," would be to
identify abusive creditor and debtor behavior. I further argue that both the
proceduralist and the traditionalist could agree on a least common denominator
definition that characterizes abuse as unilateral behavior by either the creditor or
the debtor that is likely to reduce the value of the firm. The purpose of muddy
rules is to allow such behavior to be brought before a judge, and as a second order
effect, to alert the parties to the possibility that abusive behavior (either ex ante or
ex post) will be presented to a judge and sanctioned. In short, muddy rules can
and should be used in the Bankruptcy Code to discourage ineJficient noncooperative behavior between and among transacting parties.
This model of statutory drafting and judicial behavior, crafted within the
confines of the proceduralist "should not," counsels a statute that looks a lot like
the current bankruptcy statute and suggests a judge that looks a lot like the
traditionalist judge that the proceduralists fear. I argue, therefore, that the
proceduralist "should not" alone is insufficient to create the prescriptive divide
that exists.24 Instead, the divide appears to lie over the proceduralists' "cannot"over whether judges can distinguish abusive from non-abusive behavior.
In Part IV, I explore the implications of the proceduralist "cannot" by
relaxing the assumption of judicial competence and demonstrate that even the
proceduralist "cannot" does not generate an argument for wholesale limitation of
judicial discretion. Even if one assumes incompetent judges, a consistent
proceduralist would allocate muddy and crystalline rules much the same way as
under the assumption of competent judges. The rationale, however, would be
slightly different. Instead of relying on the judge to spot abuse, the purpose of the
muddy rule would be to increase the cost of non-cooperative behavior in contexts
where such abuse is likely. The curious result, however, is that, rationale
notwithstanding, these two different sets of assumptions yield similar approaches
to statutory drafting.

22.
Constrained only by the principle that redistribution should only be in the
name of increasing the size of the bankruptcy pie.
23.
This is not to say that there are not some real differences buried in this
definition. There are disagreements about how the "maximized" value of the firm should be
divided among stakeholders and about whether the positive and negative externalities of a
firm's existence should be considered when "valuing" the firm. By describing this
definition as a least common denominator, I am arguing that this definition identifies a type
of behavior that both proceduralists and traditionalists would view as abusive.
Traditionalists might find additional forms of creditor behavior abusive, while
proceduralists might find certain additional debtor behavior abusive. In adopting this
definition, I seek to answer the proceduralists on their own terms.
24.
A second proceduralist "should not" is beyond the scope of this Article.
Proceduralists take the view that the Bankruptcy Code itself should not disturb nonbankruptcy entitlements, while traditionalists argue that the Bankruptcy Code may properly
seek to redistribute the burden of personal and business failure among creditors. The
Warren and Baird articles, supra note 21, reflect differing views regarding this second
"should not."
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In Part V, I give selected examples of "bad crystals," proposed by
bankruptcy reformers and bankruptcy scholars, and show that they reflect both a
misunderstanding of the role of mud in statutory drafting and, in some cases, a
desire by interest groups to lock in legislative gains, rather than a desire for
efficiency.

II. COMPETING WORLD VIEws AND THE ROLE OF BANKRUPTCY
JUDGES: "SHOULD NOT" VERSUS "CANNOT"

For a dozen years, the world of bankruptcy scholarship has been divided
' Broadly speaking,
into two camps, the "proceduralists" and the "traditionalists." 25
the two camps split along two axes. The first division is normative, over whether
Congress or bankruptcy judges should pursue redistributive goals in the name of
"bankruptcy policy." The proceduralists view the sole goal of bankruptcy as
generating the highest return for creditors, while traditionalists see a role in
bankruptcy for protecting groups harmed by failure, such as employees, tort
victims, retirees, and even the surrounding community.26 The second division is
empirical, over the institutional capacity of bankruptcy judges to achieve either the
goal of social equity or even efficient disposition of assets.2 In this section, I
explore the scholarly divide and seek to show how these two axes, respectively the
proceduralist "should not" and the proceduralist "cannot," appear, at first glance,
to drive the proceduralist preference for limited judicial discretion and crystalline
rules in bankruptcy.
A. The Proceduralist,the Traditionalist,and the Bankruptcy Judge-Thesisand
Antithesis

According to Douglas Baird, three litmus test questions, or axioms,
determine a scholar's affiliation. These questions are (1) whether the Bankruptcy
Code should seek to rehabilitate firms; (2) whether bankruptcy judges should alter
non-bankruptcy entitlements in order to rehabilitate firms; and (3) whether
bankruptcy judges are capable of distinguishing likely candidates for
reorganization from firms that are destined to fail. The paradigmatic proceduralist
answers "no" to each question, while the paradigmatic traditionalist answers "yes"
to all three. In this section, I will look briefly at each question, and show how,
layer upon layer, each answer appears to reinforce the proceduralist's preference
for crystals and the traditionalist's fondness for mud.

See Baird, supra note 8.
25.
26.
See GRoss, supra note 13, at 19-24 ("Looked at as a society's mechanism
for addressing these many failures, bankruptcy becomes a receptacle for some of society's
most weighty problems. It cannot be dismissed as insignificant. Bankruptcy is like a threelegged stool, once the third leg-the interests of the community-becomes visible.")
See infra note 69.
27.
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1. Redistributionand the Bankruptcy Code

The first litmus test focuses on whether the Bankruptcy Code
incorporates (or should incorporate) redistributive goals. Baird asks: should
bankruptcy law seek to rehabilitate firms?' The traditionalist says yes. To quote
Elizabeth Warren:
To the extent that it reallocates assets from a particular party to the
group as a whole, thereby enabling the sale of an intact business or a

reorganization effort, the Code carries out a deliberate distributional
policy in favor of all those whom a business failure would have hurt.
The choice to make bankruptcy "rehabilitative" represents a desire
to protect these parties along with the debtor and creditors who are

more directly affected. 29

The traditionalists' Code seeks to protect jobs and communities."
Proceduralists, by contrast, see any such efforts as doomed at best and
counterproductive at worst. "Firms must live or die in the market. All bankruptcy
can do is ensure that fights among creditors and other investors.. .do not accelerate
a firm's liquidation."'" Baird's proceduralist nonetheless salvages a role for
bankruptcy law. Proceduralists distinguish between two types of distress, financial
and economic, one which bankruptcy can help resolve, and one which it cannot. 2
The distinction turns on whether the firm is worth more to the creditors dead than
alive.
Economic distress is an incurable disease. A firm in economic distress
produces a product or service that nobody wants. Baird evokes the image of a bad
Chinese restaurant or a suburban pizza parlor that doesn't deliver. 3 In Baird's
28.

Id. at 577.

29.
Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy Making in an Imperfect World, 92
MICH. L. REv. 336, 355 (1993). According to Baird, "The traditionalists believe that
bankruptcy law serves an important purpose in rehabilitating firms." Baird, supra note 8, at

577. Note, however, that even when Warren speaks of redistribution, it is against the
background of I1 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(7), the best interests test of the Bankruptcy Code, which
states that no plan of reorganization can be confirmed unless each creditor receives more
under the Chapter I1 plan than they would have received from a liquidation under Chapter
7. See generally Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy and the Entitlements of the Government:
Whose Money Is it Anyway?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 993 (1995).
30.
See GRoss, supra note 13, at 19-24 (providing the most recent exposition of
this position).
31.
Baird, supra note 8, at 578.
See id. at 580-81.
32.
33.
See Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, 50 LAW & Co.VrIP.
PROBS. 173, 183 (1987). Baird has used the restaurant example before, though he locates it
in a small town:
Consider the following example. A restaurant in a small town serves
heavy, overpriced food that few want. There is a rapid turnover of
employees. Waiters come and go particularly quickly because the
absence of business means that there is little in the way of tips. The
owner of the restaurant is unhappy because he is losing money and all
his friends always complain to him about the food and prices at his
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view, "[O]ne cannot justify a bankruptcy law whose goal is to prolong the life of a
bad restaurant.

'34

By contrast, financial distress is the province of bankruptcy law.

Financial distress arises when the underlying business is sound, but is not earning
sufficient income to pay its debts. In the proceduralist world, "[T]he aim should be
' As Baird sees it, "The
to ensure that a firm's assets are put to their best use."35

mission of bankruptcy is to ensure that firms do not fail simply because they have
creditors they cannot pay. A market economy works when firms that cannot
compete effectively are allowed to fail. 36

If the world were this simple and markets worked that well, there would
be no reason for bankruptcy law at all. 37 At least in theory, the market, and hence
the creditors, should realize that the business is worth more as a going concern
than if divided piecemeal and should be able to restructure the debtor's finances
consensually. Baird's principal contribution to the debate in his earlier work,

alone38 and in conjunction with Thomas Jackson,39 has been recognizing that

insolvency creates a "common pool" problem. The first-in-time principle of state
debt collection law40 creates a collective action problem among creditors that
cannot be resolved without some form of government intervention. 4 Baird writes:

restaurant. He was much happier in his old job as a bank loan officer.
This restaurant is a firm that has failed.
Id.
Baird, supra note 8, at 582. Baird offers this example:
[A] toy manufacturer borrowed a large amount of money to develop and
market a toy tied to a movie that later flopped. The people responsible
for this debacle have left the firm. The current managers are now the
best in the business. Nevertheless, this huge loan and the firm's other
obligations exceed the value of the finn itself. The firm is in fine shape
with respect to everything it now does, but it cannot pay its debts. This
firm is infinancialdistress.
Id. at 580-81 (emphasis added).
35.
Id. at 582.
36.
Id. One can accept Baird's distinction between financial distress and
34.

economic distress without accepting the entire proceduralist agenda. Along with this
distinction, Baird's proceduralists also harbor a skepticism about the cognitive abilities of
judges and specifically about their ability to distinguish between economic and financial
distress. Conversely, the proceduralist holds no such skepticism about the ability of the
market to make such distinctions accurately. See id. at 588.
37.
Advocates of "contract" bankruptcy take this view, arguing that there is no
need for bankruptcy law to solve the collective action problem described by Baird and
Jackson, because creditors can solve this problem, at the time of lending, by entering into
"bankruptcy contracts" ex ante. See Rasmussen, supra note 11, at 51; Schwartz, supra note
10, at 1820-21.
38.
See Baird, supra note 33, at 183-84.
39.
See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, FraudulentConveyance Law
and Its ProperDomain, 38 VAND. L. Rav. 829 (1985); Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy,
Non-BankruptcyEntitlements, and the Creditors'Bargain,91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982).
40.
Outside of bankruptcy, state law creates various mechanisms that allow
creditors to enforce debt obligations by empowering them to seize assets of the debtor.
These include enforcement of consensual security interests, foreclosure of judgment liens,
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Without a collective bankruptcy proceeding, each creditor will tend

to rush towards the debtor's assets when the best course is patience.
For example, all the creditors might agree, if they were able to meet
and bind one another, that it was in their best interest to give the
restaurant owner a second chance. The restaurant might work with a
new chef and a newv menu, and the value of a successful
restaurant-even discounting for the chance of a second failure-is
much greater than the value of a restaurant's equipment sold
piecemeal. But only a collective proceeding, such as the one federal
bankruptcy law provides, might give these diverse ovners the
chance to pursue such a goal.... In short, we may not desire a world
without bankruptcy because the self-interest of creditors leads to a
collective action problem, and a legal mechanism is needed to
of individuals does not run counter to the
ensure that the self-interest
42
interests of the group.
Under the proceduralist view, however, the role of bankruptcy law and of
the bankruptcy judge is limited to conquering this collective action problem and
preventing inefficient liquidations!'
The traditionalist, as described by Baird, does not envision a bad
restaurant, but instead a factory in a small town." Unlike the failure of a

and garnishment. The common theme is that once one creditor has "perfected" its property
interest in a particular piece of the debtor's property, that property is no longer available to
the other creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 544 (1994).
See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE Ac iON: PUBUC
41.
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (rev. ed. 1971). As creditors realize that the debtor is in
trouble, they become participants in the so-called "race of diligence," turning to state law
debt collection remedies and grabbing up the property of the debtor in satisfaction of their
debts. Forbearance is foolhardy in such a situation, because the forbearing creditor runs the
risk that other creditors will seize property during the forbearance. See Baird, supra note 33,
at 183-84.
42.
Baird, supra note 33, at 183-84; see also Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H.
Jackson, BargainingAfter the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute PriorityRule, 55 U.
CHI. L. Ray. 738, 749-50 (1988) ("Because bankruptcy is a collective proceeding, the
bankruptcy judge has the power in some cases to bind nonconsenting parties. Without such
a power, there would be no way to overcome the collective action problem that is the
justification for bankruptcy in the first instance."); Eric A. Posner, The PoliticalEconomy
ofthe Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96 Micu. L. REV. 47, 50 (1997) (noting that the state
law collective action problem creates a need for bankruptcy law).
Contract bankruptcy scholars, such as Barry Adler, Robert Rasmussen, and
43.
Alan Schwartz, have carried Baird's position even further, arguing that the collective
solution required for efficient behavior upon insolvency can be reached through contracts or
corporate charter terms negotiated before credit is extended. See supra note 11 and
accompanying text. Indeed, such contracts are possible as a theoretical matter, but there are
many situations where either the cost associated with negotiating such contracts ex ante or
information problems that exist at the time of contracting may render it impossible or
impractical to put such arrangements in place. See Susan Block-Lieb, The Logic and Limits
of ContractBankruptcy, 2001 ILL. L. REv. 503 (200 1).
44.
See Baird, supra note 8, at 582-83:
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restaurant, the failure of the factory may have significant spillover effects
(negative externalities, to use the economist's term). Employees may lose jobs,
suppliers may lose customers, and the economy of the whole town could suffer.
As Baird describes it, when looking at a lemon (the bad restaurant), the
proceduralist says liquidate. Indeed, he points out, so, grudgingly, would the
traditionalist.4" Similarly, when looking at an apple or an orange (the factory), the
traditionalist says reorganize, but even the proceduralist46 grudgingly recognizes
that some breathing space may be necessary to counteract the collective action
problem that is inherent in state law debt collection devices.47 The difference here
lies not in what to do in a particular case, but "in the presumptions one brings."4
The proceduralist position on this first axiom thus turns on two
presumptions: (1) that markets work efficiently; and (2) that the firm and its
creditors are internalizing the costs of its operation and will internalize all of the
costs of its failure.4 9 These assumptions inhere in Baird's choice of the

The disputes a firm has with its creditors present a court with an
opportunity to solve a number of different problems.... If the firm
closes, workers lose their jobs, suppliers lose a crucial customer, and the
economy of the entire town is thrown into jeopardy. These spillover
effects justify a bankruptcy law that prevents creditors from [seeking to]
destroy the firm in pursuit of their narrow self-interests. To be sure, one
cannot ignore market forces forever, but bankruptcy law creates a
breathing space that mitigates the harshness of these forces and gives
firms, their workers and their communities a second chance.
Id.

See id. at 583 ("Both traditionalists and proceduralists recognize the
45.
difference between a bad restaurant in a large town and a large factory in a small one.
Everyone would agree that the former is a less likely candidate for a successful
reorganization than the latter.").
46.
See id. It should be noted, however, that Baird would take a slightly different
route than would Korobkin or Gross. Korobkin and Gross think that saving jobs is an end in
itself. See GROSS, supra note 13, at 206-14; Korobkin, supra note 13, at 741. Baird would
likely argue instead that the sunk costs and thin markets may give significant leverage to
creditors with a security interest in the debtors' assets. These creditors will have a strong
incentive to use this leverage to extort value from other creditors. The result of bargaining
is likely to be inefficient, and bankruptcy law protection is therefore necessary. See Baird,
supra note 8, at 583. Baird's rationale for this breathing space lies in a hypothetical
"creditor's bargain." He suggests that if the creditors had bargained ev ante over the
appropriate insolvency regime, they would have chosen one that includes breathing space
for the debtor upon insolvency. Not all proceduralists agree with Baird on this point; they
would go further and suggest that there is no reason to rely on a hypothetical bargain where
actual bargaining is (they believe) possible. See, e.g., Rasmussen, supra note 11, at 51;
Schwartz, supra note 10, at 1820-21.
47.
See Baird, supra note 33, at 184.
48.
Baird, supra note 8, at 583.
49.
This last assumption, in particular, pervades the proceduralist literature. See,
e.g., Schwartz, supra note 10, at 1815-17 ("[C]ommunity protection is important only when
an insolvent firm would be difficult for a community to replace. Bankruptcy law should not
attempt to protect communities even in this case, however, for efficiency and equity
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proceduralist paradigm, the bad restaurant in a big city. The restaurant is
surrounded by relatively robust real estate, capital and labor markets. Employees
should be able to find other jobs in the restaurant industry. The fixtures can be
sold at auction, and the space can likely be relet within a reasonable time. It is also
realistic to think that all of the parties are at the table. While a good restaurant can
do wonders for a neighborhood, and may have positive spillover effects, a bad one
does not. Also, the number of parties involved is relatively small, so there should
not be significant collective action problems.
The traditionalist paradigm-the large factory in the small townreverses both of these presumptions. The assets owned by the factory are not
liquid, and labor markets for trained employees do not always function smoothly.
Creditors are diffuse. It may be difficult to negotiate with all creditor and investor
constituencies simultaneously, and finally, both the positive and negative
externalities associated with the factory's operations make it quite likely that a fair
number of affected parties (many of whom will even be creditors) will not be at
the owners negotiate with investors and creditors outside of
the table as
50

bankruptcy.

reasons."); Steven L. Schvarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract:A Banknptcy Paradigm,

77 TEx. L. REv. 515, 589 (1999). Schwarcz vrote:
I assume that allowing prebankruptcy contracting under the limited
circumstances contemplated in this article would not make a debtor's
managers more likely to engage in risky ventures for the benefit of the

shareholders. For example, managers might gamble the proceeds of a
loan made possible by a prebankruptcy contract in order to maximize
shareholder value even though such a gamble would prejudice
involuntary creditors.
Id. But this assumption has been cast into question by the work of Lynn LoPucki and
Lucian Bebehuk. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uncasy Casefor the
Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857 (1996); Lynn M. LoPucki,
The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887 (1994). One notable exception
here is Robert Rasmussen, who appears to acknowledge that the subordination of tort
claimants and other voluntary claimants may create an opportunity for firms to externalize
some of the risk of their operations. See Rasmussen, supra note 11, 64-66. To the extent
that Rasmussen would accord priority to these claims, his work is exempt from this
criticism.
50.
See Lynn LoPucki, The Unsecured CreditorsBargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887,
1898-1901 (1994) ("The tort example illustrates the fundamental nature of security. It is
not as Jackson and Kronman present it, a contract among debtor, secured creditor and
unsecured creditor. Only the debtor need sign; the 'consent' of the unsecured creditor is
implied in the best case and a blatant fiction in the worst."). Baird's opposition to
rehabilitation in the name of reorganization appears at first to be based purely on utilitarian
grounds. In other words, Baird's view is that in a world where markets generally work, it is
unlikely that the externalities associated with failure will be so great that they will swamp
the interest of the creditors who determine the debtor's fate. It is not, by any means, clear
that this view is shared by other "proceduralists," many of whom appear to oppose
redistribution on moral grounds. See Susan Block-Lieb, supra note 43. Thus, there appears
to be a divide within the proceduralist camp between those who take a social welfare
maximizing approach and use a Kaldor-Hicks definition of efficiency, and those who take

572

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:3

As such, when the two academic "schools" paint different pictures of
bankruptcy law, they do so not because of a fundamental disagreement about what
to do on a particular set of facts, but instead, like the proverbial blind men
examining different parts of the same bankrupt elephant, they disagree over the
dominant paradigm. Is the elephant a rope, a tree, or a wall? Is the debtor a bad
restaurant that makes inedible egg rolls or undelivered pizza, or Chrysler with a
cash-flow problem? The question is not "who is right?" but "who is right when?"
and "who is more likely to be right more of the time?" The choice drives one's
view of how decision-making authority ought to be allocated between the statute,
judges, and the market. If one envisions a failing restaurant, a simple streamlined
statute with limited judicial involvement will suffice. If one is trying to maximize
the value of a factory, a more ambitious statute, and more judicial involvement,
may be required.
2. Redistribution and the Bankruptcy Judge

The next fault line (the second "axiom") turns not on the paradigmatic
bankruptcy case, but on the paradigmatic bankruptcy judge. To what extent should
bankruptcy judges be permitted to interfere with pre-bankruptcy entitlements? 5'
As Baird articulates it, proceduralists think that "ex ante effects matter," while
traditionalists do not.52 Bankruptcy judges should apply contracts and statutes as
written and should not adjust pre-bankruptcy entitlements "ex post," If bankruptcy
judges seek to make the best of a bad situation at the time of failure, rather than
simply adjudicating rights based on pre-bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy
entitlements, debtors will forum shop into bankruptcy. 3 Firms will file for
bankruptcy to take advantage of special bankruptcy rules or sympathetic
bankruptcy judges.5' Therefore, the role of the proceduralist's bankruptcy judge
should be limited to enforcement of non-bankruptcy entitlements, conquering the
collective action problem and facilitating the sale of the debtor's assets. Judicial
activism (in the form of ex post readjustment of pre-bankruptcy legal entitlements)
should not, according to the proceduralist, be tolerated in bankruptcy judges. 5
creditor welfare maximizing approach and use Pareto optimality as the definition of
efficiency. Again, the argument in this Article proceeds from the second and narrower of
these two approaches, but that is not the only defensible position.
51.
It is important to recognize here that the focus is on the judge, not on the
statute. Baird does not appear to be focusing here on statutory protections for employees or
tort claimants or victims of fraud. While such protections are, on some level redistributive,

because they are written into the statute, they become, in effect, implied terms in the terms
of credit ex ante.
52.
Baird, supra note 8, at 589-90.
See Baird, supra note 21, at 824-27.
53.
54.
See id.
See Baird, supra note 8, at 589 ("Traditionalists support a type of judicial
55.
activism that legal scholars do not encounter elsewhere."). Note that even here, the
paradigm seems to control the prescription. This is true, even if one does not, as Baird does
not, think that community interests need to be considered along with those of the creditors
and investors in the firm. Baird recognizes that the creditors of an insolvent business face a
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Traditionalists, by contrast, would allow judges to modify some prebankruptcy entitlements, ex post, in the interest of rehabilitating debtors or in the
interest of fairness as it appears after the fact. This worries the proceduralists
because it alters the breach and performance incentives of the law of contracts7s
and the incentives to take reasonable care in the law of torts" that exist outside of
bankruptcy. Proceduralists therefore fear that the traditionalists' favored
bankruptcy regime will discourage contracting ex ante, because potential
contracting parties will know that the debtor will be able to hide from the
consequences of its behavior in bankruptcy, and may encourage unreasonably
risky behavior for the same reason.
Note again, however, that the proceduralist objection to judicial
reallocation of non-bankruptcy entitlements is apparently based on the utilitarian
goal of maximizing wealth, rather than a libertarian opposition to redistribution.
Indeed, it appears to be judicial discretion, as a product of muddy rules, and not
redistribution per se that troubles the proceduralist here. After all, if bankruptcy
entitlements are known by the contracting parties ex ante, they become in effect
part of that bargain. Parties can adjust their contracts to account for the bankruptcy
rule." The evil here is mud. The bankruptcy-specific rule may not in fact be a rule
at all. It may merely consist of a mandate to the judge to do justice.
"Traditionalists," says the proceduralist, "support a type of judicial intervention
and judicial activism that legal scholars do not encounter elsewhere."59 But Baird's
account of what is typical in the non-bankruptcy world may not be entirely
accurate. While the type of judicial behavior advocated by traditionalists is not
common in commercial cases outside of bankruptcy, it is not particularly unusual
in public law litigation." Operating from a private paradigm, however, Baird's
collective action problem, and that negotiated solutions which preserve going concern value

are therefore notoriously difficult to arrange outside of bankruptcy. The factory, with
disbursed and numerous creditors, will face a significantly worse collective action problem
than the pizza parlor. If the factory is worth more as a going concern, every creditor has an
incentive to use what leverage it has to exact the largest possible share of that value.
Without the procedural protections (hence "proceduralism"), there would be many
inefficient liquidations. See supra notes 33-34. Thus, more involvement by the judge may
be necessary in these larger, more complicated cases.

56.
For a discussion of the theory of efficient breach, see generally E. AL.AN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTs § 12.3, at 761-65 (3d ed. 1999); RicHARD A. PosNEt,
EcoNoNuc ANALYSIS OF LAW 117-28 (4th ed. 1992). See also L.L. Fuller & William R.
Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in ContractDamages, 46 YALE U. 52 (1936); Oliver

Wendell Holmes, The Path ofthe Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
57.

See POSNER, supra note 56, at 163-67.

58.

This does not answer the efficiency objection completely. Imagine that

bankruptcy contains a rule intended to protect employees from the full force of business

failure. This rule will influence every company that contracts in anticipation of bankruptcy.
The rule will be efficient only if the benefit to employees outweighs the social cost of

including this bankruptcy specific rule in every contract.
59.

Baird, supra note 8, at 590.

60.

See infra note 78 and accompanying text. While the proceduralists seek to

assimilate bankruptcy into a purely private paradigm, the traditionalists (as described by

Baird and exemplified by Korobkin and Gross) seem to follow a more purely public mode.
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fear of ex post adjustment morphs into a fear of bankruptcy judges with a roving
mandate to do equity, and the fear of judicial discretion turns further into a
preference for crystalline over muddy rules.
3. Efficiency and JudicialCompetence
This leads to the third proceduralist axiom. Traditionalists view
bankruptcy judges as different from other judges, and the difference manifests
itself, again, in a preference for mud over crystals. The traditionalist views the
judge's role in the case as central, indeed heroic:
Most of the action takes place in discussions and negotiations
among the various players, mediated by the bankruptcy judge who
decides discrete issues of law while steering the players in the right
direction.... [T]he bankruptcy judge brings parties to the bargaining
table. The judge forces them to negotiate and compromise, while
simultaneously ensuring that rights are protected and that the
substantive goals of bankruptcy are vindicated. 6'
See generally GROss, supra note 13; Korobkin, supra note 13. This article takes the view
that bankruptcy law can create value over and above that which would exist in its absence,
and that no particular creditor has an a prioriclaim to that reorganization value. As such,
there is room for the judge and/or Congress to reallocate that surplus in the interest both of
correcting market failure and serving other legitimate governmental goals. See generally
Mann, supra note 29. In this regard, bankruptcy law is public, and the bankruptcy judge,
like a federal district judge, must be able to function in the public mode.
The approach advocated in this Article draws on both the economic and traditionalist
accounts but follows neither precisely. Like the proceduralist, I assume that the goal of a
business bankruptcy case is to achieve a socially efficient result. Unlike the proceduralist, I
don't assume that such an efficient result can be achieved by parties bargaining ex ante,
because I don't assume that all interested parties are at the table when an entity
incorporates, or even when an entity borrows. Limited liability and the institution of
secured credit render it axiomatic that there will be negative externalities associated with
the operation of a business that fails. Collective action problems inherent in any complex
business organization will also mean that important creditor interests will not be effectively
represented in the bankruptcy bargaining process. Thus, bankruptcy law has a role in
correcting inherent imperfections in the market. Employees and tort claimants, for example,
may have an interest that needs to be protected in the bankruptcy case,
61.
Baird, supra note 8, at 593; see, e.g., Warren, supra note 13, at 351-52. As
Elizabeth Warren puts it:
Bankruptcy Courts also directly influence efforts to enhance the value of
the bankruptcy estate. These courts enjoy enormous discretionary power
that they can use to enhance the value of a failing business. Judges must
make countless decisions-whether to permit the assumption of an
executory contract, to appoint an examiner, or to approve the terms of a
postpetition financing agrement-based on their assessment of what will
yield the largest returns for the estate. In addition, a number of statutory
provisions specifically require the court to exercise commercial
judgement. For example, the judge must choose between competing
valuations to decide whether a debtor may substitute collateral, or to
evaluate business projections to determine if a reorganization plan is
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For the traditionalist, muddy rules are a free ticket to court-guided discourse. To
the proceduralist, by contrast, "giving discretion to the judge makes sense only
when she is well-positioned to use iL"
The proceduralists do not view the bankruptcy judge as well positioned to

intervene or to guide. To the proceduralist, the job of the judge, if she were up to
it, would be to distinguish firms that are economically sound but financially
distressed (the factory in a small town with a large outstanding tort claim) from
firms that are not economically sound and are therefore financially distressed (the
bad restaurant). Baird looks to the path-breaking work of cognitive psychologists
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky on endowment effects to support his view
that bankruptcy judges are not up to that task. Baird states:
As human beings, we tend to weigh more heavily the events
immediately before us. As a result, we have a natural tendency to
underestimate the effects of bankruptcy on those who are not in
court and whose stories cannot be told with particularity. We can try
to correct for this built-in bias when we use our intuitions, but there
are few reliable benchmarks to help us.63
The proceduralist believes that judges will be biased in favor of
reorganization because of their desire to help out the parties before them. It is this
skeptical viev of judges that makes crystalline statutory drafting and
presumptions about the paradigmatic bankruptcy case so important. On the one
hand, the proceduralist view that judges are incompetent leads to the view that
discretion must be limited. On the other hand, the proceduralists must recognize
that statutes are relatively inflexible, and necessarily over and underinclusive.
Therefore, the governing presumption will determine the outcome in many cases.
Because the proceduralist envisions a pizza parlor and an incompetent judge, the
proceduralist prescribes a minimalist judge who rules only when she has to, and a

reasonably calculated to support its proposed payout. These fact-specific
inquiries demand that judges make careful business decisions, as well as
thoughtfully apply legal principles.
Id.
62.
Baird, supra note 8, at 593. The view that bankruptcy judges are ill-equipped
for this task is expressed most directly by Christopher Frost:
The bankruptcy process is institutionally incapable of resolving the loss
distribution issues among all who are interested in the outcome of the
case. Even assuming that the social costs accompanying business failure
should be spread over a broad base, the judicial system is particularly illequipped to make the types of judgments required to distribute losses in
a way that bears any resemblance to rational policy.
Frost, supra note 9, at 77.
63.
Baird, supra note 8, at 587 & nA0 (citing Daniel Kahneman et al.,
Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J.POL ECon.
1325, 1342-46 (1990); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristicfor
Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL 207, 208 (1973); Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristicsand Biases, 185
SCIENCE 1124, 1127-28 (1974)).
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minimalist statute that gives the judge limited discretion so that rulings should
rarely be necessary.'
B. The Proceduralist"Cannot" and the Proceduralist"ShouldNot"
Baird declares the debate indeterminate, unresolvable through empirical
research, and ultimately resolvable only through a "study of aesthetics and
morals."'65 The answer turns on whether one believes that it is moral to use
bankruptcy to achieve redistributive goals. Baird's proceduralist pretty clearly
thinks not. This conclusion does not appear, however, to be driven purely by the
utilitarian reasoning that Baird uses throughout the article. The proceduralists'
moral subtext is that Robin Hood was an outlaw, not a hero. However, neither the
utilitarian's empirical instincts nor the libertarian's moral imperative are sufficient
to yield the proceduralist prescription for the crystalline statute and minimalist
bankruptcy judge.
The proceduralist vision of the judge and the proceduralist preference for
crystals require two distinct moves. The first, described above, is based either on
"morals" or on empirical instincts about bankruptcy cases. The second is based
instead upon empirical instincts about the relative institutional capacities of judges
and markets. Disentangling these two distinct moves demonstrates the extent to
which the prescription for crystalline drafting turns on the proceduralist view of
judicial competence.
1. The Proceduralist"Should Not"

Baird's first two axioms, that bankruptcy judges should not favor
reorganization and that bankruptcy judges should not engage in post hoc
reallocation of pre-bankruptcy entitlements, while justified on efficiency grounds,
are both based on a moral judgment, supported by an empirical instinct, that I have
labelled the proceduralist "should not." This proceduralist "should not" comes in
both a strong version and a weak version. The strong version is based on what
Susan Block-Lieb has described as a neo-libertarian moral view that disfavors
redistribution of wealth, and thus exalts, and declares inviolate, non-bankruptcy
66
entitlements.
This is not, indeed cannot be, the vision that Baird advocates. In such a
world, there is no room for bankruptcy law at all. Baird and Jackson, though not
all proceduralists, 67 operate from a somewhat weaker perspective, recognizing that
64.
Curiously, Baird does not appear to feel that he needs to explain why
cognitive imperfections of judges as decision-makers automatically render them inferior to
markets (with their own peculiar and acknowledged imperfections) or, for that matter,
legislatures (with their own susceptibility to interest group capture).
65.
See Baird, supra note 8, at 599 & n.84 (quoting Ronald Coase and citing
Frank H. Knight).
66.
See Block-Leib, supra note 43.
67.
Some advocates of contract bankruptcy would not even go this far. See, e.g.,
supra note 11.
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non-bankruptcy entitlements may need to be modified in order to, and only in
order to, resolve the collective action problem that is created upon insolvency.
What they oppose is redistribution for its own sake, not redistribution that
increases the value of the bankruptcy estate.'
2. The Proceduralist"Cannot"
The difficulty faced by the proceduralist in advocating limited discretion
for bankruptcy judges is that once one has moved to the weak version of the
proceduralist "should not," where does one stop? One can justify a powerful
judicial role, at least in some cases (the financially distressed, but economically
sound, factory in a small town, with diffuse creditors who individually have an
incentive to seize assets). The proceduralist must, therefore, make a second move.
This is What I have labelled the proceduralist "cannot" Baird argues that even if

we assume that cases exist where the exercise of judicial discretion in order to
facilitate an efficient (pareto superior) reorganization would be justified,
bankruptcy judges are not capable of identifying them. If the judge cannot
distinguish likely candidates for reorganization from unlikely ones, the appropriate
response is to advocate the minimalist judge.69
Baird develops his view of judicial capability more fully elsewhere,"
while in another article, Bankruptcy, Redistributive Policies and the Limits of the
This weak version of the proceduralist "should not" is embodied, as a matter
68.
of positive law, in the "best interests test" contained in §§ 1129(a)(7) and 1325(a)(4) and
(5) of the Bankruptcy Code. A plan of business reorganization under Chapter 11 and a wage
earner's plan under Chapter 13 cannot be confirmed unless every creditor receives more
than she would have in liquidation. Reorganization must be Pareto superior. This is the
hypothetical creditor's bargain advocated by Baird and Jackson-the bargain that the
creditors would, presumably, have agreed to in advance of bankruptcy, had they had the
opportunity to bargain. See JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMirrs OF BANKRuFrcY LAW, s pra note
14, at 7-19.
69.
The views of Christopher Frost are typical here. See Frost, supra note 9, at
75. Frost notes:
While this institutional capability argument has been made by several
economic theorists, including Baird and Jackson themselves, the concern
has been inadequately developed in favor of the forum-shopping
argument. But there is more to the institutional capability argument than
has been heretofore made. Rather than being an adjunct to the forumshopping concerns that dominate the economic analysis, the argument
deserves elevation to an independent justification for an investor-focused
bankruptcy regime.
Id. at 91 (citation omitted).
See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations
70.
and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of
Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 102-03 (1984). Baird and
Jackson's limited viev of the bankruptcy process turns, at least, on the difficulty of the task
facing bankruptcy judges:
Fashioning remedies for all the harm a failing business may bring is
difficult and beyond the competence of a bankruptcy court. The wider
effects of the failure of a particular enterprise are not easy to assess. A
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JudicialProcess,7 Christopher Frost uses the limits of judicial capacity to justify
the proceduralist vision, arguing that even if one were to accept redistribution in
favor of community interests as an appropriate goal of bankruptcy law, bankruptcy
judges are not institutionally well suited to accomplish this goal. 2 Baird's use of
the competence argument is even more aggressive than that of Frost, arguing that
judicial competence, or lack thereof, renders bankruptcy judges unable to
distinguish efficient reorganizations from inefficient ones." Thus the
proceduralist74 preference for crystalline rules over muddy ones seems to be driven
by a weak version of the proceduralist "should not," coupled with a strong version
of the proceduralist "cannot."
C. Proceduralists,Traditionalists,and the BackgroundDebates
Bankruptcy law does not exist in a vacuum, and neither does bankruptcy
scholarship. The two key proceduralist moves have a deeper provenance that
needs to be unpacked and situated. Each axiom is linked to older, non-bankruptcy,
scholarly debates, each of which in turn rests on its own set of assumptions. Once
these "background debates" are disaggregated, the relationship between the
proceduralist "should not," the proceduralist "cannot," and the preference for
crystalline rules becomes even clearer.

principal characteristic of a market economy is, after all, that some firms
fail, and postponing the inevitable or keeping marginal firms alive may
do more harm than good.
Id. But they go further and register doubt regarding the capabilities of the judges
themselves:
Bankruptcy judges.. .seem to show either an inability or an
unwillingness to comprehend the possibility that secured credit may be
something more than a perverse and unfair creature of state law that
should be thwarted at every turn. Even more remarkable is their
wonderful capacity for hope, their unshakeable faith that, given time, the
firm's ship will come in. Often, bankruptcy judges seem to think that
markets systematically undervalue firms that have filed petitions in
bankruptcy. A bankruptcy judge may insist that he, not the market, is the
one best positioned to set a value on a firm in distress, even though year
after year in case after case his valuations prove wildly inflated.
Id. at 126-27; see also James J. White, Harvey's Silence, 69 AM. BANK L.J. 467, 469
(1995) ("[C]ritics note that mostly Chapter 11 does not operate as a reorganization
procedure but as a procedure for slow liquidation.").
71.
Frost, supra note 9.
72.
See id. at 134.
73.
See supra note 70.
74.
This is distinct from what Susan Block-Lieb describes as the neo-libertarian
position taken by some advocates of "contract bankruptcy." See Block-Leib, supra note 43.

These scholars, Block-Lieb argues, operate from a strong version of the proceduralist

"should not." See id; see, e.g., Schwartz, Contract Theory, supra note 10, at 1821-22
("Firms could finance more projects if they had more freedom to contract, and they would
have better incentives to maximize value.").
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1. Efficient CapitalMarkets

The first background debate is over efficient capital markets!$ The
proceduralist assumption of efficient markets forms one of the bases for the
proceduralist "should not" and underlies the proceduralist "cannot." The shadow
of the debate can be found in Baird's dueling bankruptcy paradigms. The
proceduralist envisions a restaurant in a big city; the traditionalist envisions a
factory in a small town. A single restaurant does not gain much from bankruptcy
law. It has relatively few creditors, and must earn their trust, inside or outside of
bankruptcy, to reorganize. Once that trust is lost, no bankruptcy judge will be able
to replace it. Similarly, society does not lose much if it fails. If the location can
support a restaurant, then a new one will likely appear;, if the location cannot, one
will not. Assets can be shifted relatively easily. Restaurant fixture auctions are
common. There is an after-market in the things restaurants use.

If markets are working well and the transaction costs associated with
shifting assets are low, then limited goals for bankruptcy law and limited
discretion for bankruptcy judges are appropriate. Where, however, the debtor is
one with significant startup costs and substantial transaction costs associated with
shifting assets in the wake of business failure-the factory-the calculus shifts.
Even if one assumes that the sole goal of the bankruptcy system is efficiency, one
should be willing to devote more social resources to preventing the failure of a
viable factory than a bad restaurant.76 In short, the proceduralist accuses
traditionalists of ignoring the costs associated with bargaining in the shadow of
failure, but the proceduralist minimizes the cost of failure itself. The proceduralist
can do this because she's assuming a restaurant, not a factory. In short, a
presumption that markets are functioning increases the likelihood that a market
solution will be more efficient than any solution hammered out by a judge. If the
market makes few errors, then judicial errors are placed in higher relief.
2. JudicialRole

The second background debate is the debate over the role of judges (not
just bankruptcy judges). It is, after all, the bankruptcy judge who must decide
whether, in a particular case, to lift the stay and allow the creditor to foreclose on
its collateral, or to deny the motion and give the debtor a chance to attempt to
reorganize. This discussion implicates the proceduralist "cannot." Lon Fuller, in
his classic article, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication," argued that the judicial

system is at its best when it is deciding two party disputes over clear legal rules,
75.
See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash. and the
Fraudon the Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 907, 910-17 (1989).
76.
Who should contribute these resources is, of course, a separate question. To
the extent that a business reorganization in bankruptcy succeeds, and all creditors are better
off, the question is academic. Where, however, the bankruptcy fails, and some creditors are
rendered worse off by the effort of the factory to reorganize, the question is who should
bear the burden of failure.
77.
Fuller, supra note 20, at 394-404. For an updated version of the Fuller
argument in the bankruptcy context, see Frost, supra note 9, at 124-25.
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but that the system is not well equipped to deal with multiparty, polycentric
disputes. Such disputes are better left to the legislature. In the late 1970s, Abram
Chayes launched an academic response with his article, The Role of the Judge in
Public Law Litigation,78 and was joined a year later by Owen Fiss with his article,
The Forms of Justice.79 Both conceded that the need to vindicate important public
rights that were either constitutionally or statutorily created forced judges into
unaccustomed roles in multiparty disputes. Fiss and Chayes, however, did not, like
Fuller, shy away from this new role. Instead, they embraced it-Fiss from a
moralistic perspective, and Chayes focusing on figuring out how best to judge in
this unaccustomed mode."0 Both Fiss and Chayes assumed that judges were
competent to adjudicate these public rights (or at least more competent than
legislatures and markets).
In the early eighties, a third vision of the judge emerged: the judge as
mediator. The alternative dispute resolution movement advocated alternative
forms of judging to resolve disputes.8 The proceduralist favors Fuller's judge,
while casting the traditionalist judge in the role of the public law mediator. Both
the role of the judge that the proceduralist posits and the ex ante perspective that
she champions presuppose a purely private pizza parlor, not Chrysler.82 Indeed,
when Baird describes the judge outside of bankruptcy, he describes a particular
type of judge dealing with a particular type of case. The bankruptcy judge should
function like a private law judge deciding a commercial dispute.
When the paradigm shifts to the factory, however, the legitimate goals of
bankruptcy law (even if driven solely by the desire to maximize social (and
perhaps even limited to creditor) welfare) may become broader and the picture of
the judge may shift, because the factory, with its externalities, takes on some of
the attributes of a public institution. In response, the proceduralist shifts to
competence-the proceduralist "cannot." The proceduralist likens the
traditionalists' judge to a mediator and suggests that such judging may do more
harm than good. Indeed, judicial incompetence appears to have become the
78.
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L.
REv. 1281 (1976); see also Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Tern-Foreword:
Public Law Litigation andthe Burger Court, 96 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1982).
79.
Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of
Justice,93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979).

80.

See ROBERT M. COVER ET AL., PROCEDURE (1988); OWEN M. Fiss &

DOUGLAS RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS (2d ed. 1984).
81.
Compare STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES (3d ed. 1999), with Owen M. Fiss,

Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
82.
Some skeptics of the bankruptcy system have argued that Chapter 11 instead
provides a mechanism for old equity to bargain for deviations from absolute priority. While
such deviations are not uncommon in consensual plans of large public companies, Lynn
LoPucki has argued that the value of the equity retained does not significantly affect the
recovery of other creditors. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargainingover
Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139
U. PA. L. REV. 125, 141-43 (1990) (showing mostly nominal recoveries for shareholders of
insolvent companies in bankruptcy reorganization).
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rallying cry for of a broader neo-formalist program. Recently Bob Scott has
argued that limitations on judicial access to information counsel in favor of
formalistic interpretation of contracts by judges, 3 while Adrian Vermeule has
argued that limits on judicial competence suggest formalistic judicial interpretation
of statutes." Thus, while the proceduralist acknowledges that not all bankruptcy
cases can be forced into Fuller's mold, she is distrustful of the bankruptcy judge as
mediator and despairs of "efficient" public law judging. The proceduralist
therefore appears willing to drive those cases out of the system that cannot be
resolved by a bankruptcy judge operating in the classic adjudicative mode.
3. Crystals and Mud
The third and final background debate is the competition between
crystalline and muddy rules (sometimes characterized as rules and standards)' 5
This is where the action is. Crystalline rules minimize judicial discretion, clarify
property boundaries, and shift resource allocation decisions out of court and into
the market place.86 The reason for this turns on one of the earliest "law and
economics" insights.87 When parties to a dispute are making the decision whether

to litigate or settle the case, they will only litigate to and through trial if they have
different assessments of the likely outcome of the trial. If they agree on what will
transaction outside of court
happen in court, they will be
88 able to arrange a market
"in the shadow of the law."

83.
See Robert E. Scott, The Casefor Formalism in RelationalContract, 94 Nw.
U. L. REv. 847 (2000).
See Adrian Vermeule, InterpretiveChoice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 74 (2000).
84.
85.
Compare Rose, supra note I, with RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBUS OF
JURISPRUDENCE 42-61 (1990); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic
Analysis, 42 DuKE W..557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in PrivateLaw
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
86.
The mud and crystals distinction often gets confused with the distinction
between property rules and liability rules, but they are not the same. CompareRose, supra
note 1, with Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972); Ian Ayres & Eric
Talley, Solomonic Bargaining:Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coascan Trade,
104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995); Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of the Cathedral, 106 YALE L. J.
2175 (1997). Where property rules and liability rules divide over remedy (whether a nonconsensual taking can be purchased by paying damages or will instead be punished by
criminal sanction), mud and crystals divide over the clarity of the substantive legal
entitlement.

87.
88.

See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 554-66 (4th ed. 1992).
See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of

the Law: The CaseofDivorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 951 (1979).
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Fig. 1-Institutional Choice As a Function of Certainty of Legal Entitlement

.
0

Muddiness
Judicial Determination of Rights
Market Determination of Rights

This dynamic is presented graphically in Figure 1. As the muddiness of
the legal rule increases (moving to the right on the x-axis), so does the likelihood
(moving up the y-axis) of a judicial determination of rights (the solid line has an
upward slope). As the rule becomes more crystalline (moving to the left on the xaxis), the likelihood of a market decision increases (the dotted line has a
downward slope). As such, each of the three preceding background debates will
manifest itself as a preference for either a clear or a muddy rule. If one thinks that
the market will work well in a particular context, there is little reason for judicial
intervention. A crystalline rule is best. If one thinks that the market is not
functioning well, in a systematic way that can be judicially corrected, a muddy
rule may be preferred. Similarly, if one thinks that judges are institutionally better
suited, for whatever reason, to resolving the dispute (be it a traditional two-party
dispute or a polycentric public dispute) than the legislature or the market, a muddy
rule should be favored over a crystal.
When, then, should crystalline rules be used in bankruptcy law, and when
is mud preferable? In the next two sections of this Article, I explore this question
in two stages. The first stage is to ask what would happen if one were to accept the
proceduralist "should not" but reject the proceduralist "cannot." How would the
proceduralist defime her ideal judge, and what statutory architecture would follow?
I conclude that the ideal "competent" proceduralist judge would seek to identify
and prevent "abuse" in the form of inefficient non-cooperative behavior. I then
argue that crystalline and muddy rules should be allocated within the Bankruptcy
Code to allow the judge to identify "abuse" when it is most likely. The second
stage is to ask whether acceptance of the proceduralist "cannot" changes the
preferred approach to statutory drafting. I conclude that the answer is no. Even if
bankruptcy judges cannot distinguish abusive from non-abusive behavior, the
effect of muddy rules is to increase the cost of non-cooperative behavior.
Consequently, at least in bankruptcy, one may view muddy rules as a commitment

device that encourages cooperative behavior. If one agrees with Baird and Jackson
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about the existence of a collective action problem upon insolvency, the approach
to statutory drafting with incompetent judges will be virtually the same as the
approach to statutory drafting with competent ones.

1II. BANKRUPTCY JUDGES AND STATUTORY DESIGN-ASSUMING
JUDICIAL COMPETENCE

If the proceduralist could choose an ideal judge, what would that judge
do, and how would one design the Bankruptcy Code around such a paragon? In
this section, I seek to work within the proceduralist framework, accepting the
(weak) proceduralist "should not," at least insofar as it applies to judges, but
assuming judicial competence. I argue that the goal of that judge would be to
identify and prevent abuse (defined as inefficient non-cooperative behavior).' I
argue further that under this assumption, crystals and mud should be allocated
throughout the Bankruptcy Code to expose abusive behavior to judicial scrutiny.
A. Crystals and Mud--Statutory Drafting andInstitutionalChoice
As noted in the introduction, the debate between the traditionalists and
proceduralists is one of institutional choice fought out over clear versus muddy
rules. Broadly speaking, the proceduralist favors crystalline rules articulated by
Congress and interpreted by the market, while traditionalists favor muddy rules, or
standards, implemented by judges and lawyers. Indeed, one way of characterizing
the proceduralist objection to "reorganization" as a goal of the bankruptcy system
is that it has the effect of muddying crystalline non-bankruptcy legal entitlements.
The automatic stay-§ 362 of the Bankruptcy Code-provides a
demonstration of the muddying effect of bankruptcy law. The automatic stay stops
the pre-bankruptcy race to dismember a debtor by muddying the secured creditor's
state law right to pick up her marbles and go home by liquidating her collateral."
Imagine that the Perfectly Private Pizza Parlor borrows money secured by its pizza
ovens, or that Chrysler borrows money against its inventory of spare parts.
Outside of bankruptcy, the secured creditor might simply foreclose (repossess and
sell the pizza ovens or auto parts). If the debtor, or the other creditors of the
debtor, want to stop repossession and foreclosure, they have to negotiate a deal
with the secured creditor. Inside of bankruptcy, the secured creditor cannot
foreclose unless ajudge says so.
The judge's decision whether or not to lift the bankruptcy stay9' will turn
on a number of "muddy" considerations, such as (1)the value of the collateral (the
pizza ovens or auto parts);9 (2) whether the collateral is necessary to an effective

reorganization which is reasonably in prospect (can a pizza parlor stay in business
without ovens? can an automobile be made without parts?); 93 (3) whether that
89.
90.

See discussion infra notes 98, 101.
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d)(1), (2)(1994, Supp. IV 1998 & Supp. V 1999).

92.

See 11 U.S.C. § 362.
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)(A).

93.

See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (d)(2)(B).

91.
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reorganization is "reasonably in prospect" (is the debtor a goner, or can the
business be saved?); 4 and (4) whether the secured creditor's interest is
"adequately protected" (are the pizza ovens or auto parts declining in value?).S By
introducing these muddy rules, bankruptcy lav displaces the market and the state
law entitlement to foreclose, and substitutes judicial decision-making.
B. Adjudicationand Abuse: Statutory Design and JudicialRole
If the choice between mud and crystals is a choice between legislatively
driven, market-based dispute resolution on the one hand, and open-ended judicial
decision-making on the other, what is it that the judge should do when it comes
time to decide a dispute against the background of a muddy rule? In order to
determine when judicial intervention is desirable, it is necessary to determine what
judges should be doing. What is their appropriate role? The proceduralists draw a
picture, borrowed from Lon Fuller, of the judge who simply enforces nonbankruptcy entitlements.96 But this cannot be the limit of the judicial role. After
all, as we saw in the last section, when rules are clear, parties settle. Judges most
often have to decide when either the legal entitlement or the factual context is
muddy, rather than when it is clear.
In this section, I assume a competent judge and ask, what would the
proceduralist want a competent judge to do? 97 I argue that the role of judges
generally is to identify and lay bare "abusive" behavior, however that may be
defined, and that the role of muddy rules is to deter such behavior. The first part of
this section argues that the role of the judge is to identify and prevent abuse, and
that this is best accomplished with a judge operating from an adjudicative rather
than a mediative stance. In the second part of this section, I seek to define "abuse"
in the context of the Bankruptcy Code and suggest that the principal form of abuse
in bankruptcy, indeed, a definition shared by proceduralists and traditionalists (at
least as a minimum), is inefficient non-cooperative behavior.
1. Muddy Rules and Abusive Behavior
At the outset it is worth noting that crystalline rules are appropriate when
behavior is so obviously inefficient that it can simply be proscribed. No judicial
sorting is required to determine that a trustee who uses debtor funds to paint his
house has violated legal norms. However, even with seemingly crystalline rules, it
is not entirely possible to avoid uncertainty. Even a rule against theft can become
difficult to apply on the margin.
94.
See United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., 484 U.S. 365,
376 (1988) ("[T]here must be a reasonable possibility of a successful reorganization within
a reasonable time.").
95.
See II U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (1994, Supp. IV 1998 & Supp. V 1999).
See generally Fuller, supra note 20.
96.
Note that this is a somewhat artificial question, in that much recent
97.
proceduralist scholarship argues for a "new formalism," based precisely on the fact that
judges have few, if any, informational advantages over the parties. See Scott, supra note 83;
Vermeule, supra note 84.
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In her seminal article, Crystals and Aud in Property Law, Carol Rose
suggests a role for the judge, adjudicating in the face of muddy rules, and for
muddy rules themselves, that is consistent with the goal of economic efficiency. 3
When examining the effects of muddy rules, it is necessary to weigh their effects
ex ante in addition to their effects ex post. Rose points out that muddy legal rules
can have a salutary effect on commercial conduct at the time of contracting. An
open-ended rule' indicates to the parties to a transaction that, no matter how
carefully they draft their agreement, on the front end, their negotiating conduct
may, if things fall apart, be presented to the judge:
From this perspective, as indeed the more sophisticated economic
analyses tell us, crystalline rules seem less the king of the efficiency
mountain than we may normally assume. One can argue that
elaborate ex post allocations of responsibilities might be efficient
too, even if they make people's entitlements fuzzier ex ante. The
very knowledge that one cannot gull someone else, and get away
with it, makes it less likely that anyone will dissipate time and effort

in trying to find the gullible. This knowledge will also reassure
those of us who fear we may be made fools; we can go about our
business and take part in the world of trade without cowering at
home because we think we need to hire a lawyer and an accountant
every time we leave the car at a commercial parking lot.""
Open-ended rules thus have a two-layered effect. First, they increase the
likelihood ofjudicial resolution of the disputed entitlement, and second, they force
the parties to a contract, at the time of negotiation, to avert to the possibility that a
judge may have to examine the transaction in the event of a subsequent dispute.
The tendency, when looking at muddy rules, is to focus on the costs they impose
at the time a deal is coming undone. At that point, they make it more difficult to
reach a consensual resolution. However, as Rose notes, this ignores the effect of a
muddy rule, ex ante, when the deal is being struck.' 2 A muddy rule forces the
parties to avert, during negotiation, to the possibility that the bargained-for result
may, at the end of the day, appear to be unfair either to the parties or, worse yet, to
someone who was not a party to the transaction. The need to consider "how it will
look later" may make contracting more difficult, but it may also deter
overreaching during negotiations. "03

98.
Rose, supra note 1, at 600.
99.
See id.
100.
For a rule to have this effect, it is not sufficient that it be an open-ended
default rule or a rule of clear statement. To have the desired effect on behavior, the rule
must be an open-ended mandatory rule. See discussion infra Part lV.C.
101.
Rose, supra note 1,at 600.
102.
See id.
103.
Calibrating damages to achieve the optimal level of deterrence may be a
tricky business, and is beyond the scope of this article. Most of the rules discussed in this
Article are enforced by injunction rather than damages. See Edward J. Janger, Muddy
Property Rules and Information Forcing in Bankruptcy (unpublished manuscript on file
with author). Nonetheless, the uncertainty created by muddy rules may reduce the value of
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An open-textured rule, therefore, means that a judge may get an
opportunity to identify and undo abusive or opportunistic behavior, either at the
time of dispute or at the time of contracting (if it is unmasked at trial). This insight
has implications for legislators. If the legislature is concerned that a particular type
of negotiation is likely to give one party or another an opportunity to act
opportunistically,1 4 an open-textured rule may serve to deter that behavior both at
the time of contracting, and at the time of dispute. In short, muddy rules can be
used in bankruptcy (and elsewhere) to deter abusive behaviorbetween and among
transactingparties.
2. Adjudication v. CaseManagement
If the purpose of muddy rules, from a legislative perspective, is to deter
abusive behavior with the threat of judicial decision-making, what does this view
of rules say about the role of the judge? Should bankruptcy judges be principally
adjudicators or principally mediators? In relation to bankruptcy law, Congress has
behaved in a somewhat schizophrenic fashion. The 1978 bankruptcy reform
sought to reinforce an adjudicative stance, while the 1994 amendments undercut
that resolve. Prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, the
bankruptcy judge (or referee) was responsible for the administration of the case. 10
One goal of the 1978 Code was to shift the bankruptcy judges into a more
adjudicative mode in order to eliminate the perception of cronyism and bias
inherent in practice under the Act.0 6 The 1994 amendments appear to shift the
entitlements that are protected by such rules. This reduction in value may cause muddy
rules to underdeter in some cases. At the same time, muddy rules also create the possibility
that non-culpable behavior may be found to be culpable. This may lead to overdeterrence
in other cases. See John E. Calfee and Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on
Compliance With Legal Standards,70 VA. L. REV. 965, 996-97 (1984). If you assume, as I
do in this section, (1) that the judge will be able to identify abuse accurately, and (2) that
enforcement is by injunction, the level of deterrence should be, on average, optimal. This
conclusion breaks down if one recognizes that litigation is costly, and legal fees may exceed
the value of any recovery. See Keith N. Hylton, Litigation Costs and the Economic Theory
of Tort Law, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 111 (1991). Hylton points out that to deal with this it
may be necessary to shift attorney's fees to account for litigation cost.
104.
See Edward L. Rubin, Types of Contracts,Interventions of Law, 45 WAYNE
L. REv. 1903, 1910 (2000). Rubin states:
The existence of a market failure such as information asymmetry does
not mean that any contractual clause that is implicated by the failure
should be automatically voided by public authorities. It simply means
that the efficiency of the clause cannot be assumed from the fact that it
was agreed to by a willing buyer and a willing seller. Thus, the public
interventions of the criminal and contract law will not be sufficient, by
themselves, to ensure an efficient result.
Id. at 1911.
105.
See Harvey R. Miller, The ChangingFace of Chapter 11: A Reemergence of
the Bankruptcy Judge as Producer,Director and Sometimes Star of the Reorganization
PassionPlay, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 431 (1995).
106.
See generally Thomas E. Plank, Why Bankruptcy Judges Need Not and
Should Not Be Article IIIJudges, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 567 (1998).
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balance back towards the pre-Code model. Rule 7016 now allows bankruptcy
judges to encourage settlement during pretrial conferences,"? and these
amendments 08
have led some judges to perceive their role as more mediative than
adjudicative.'
Since the Bankruptcy Code appears to contemplate bankruptcy judges
operating in both an adjudicative and a mediative mode, which is preferable?
Jennifer Gerarda Brown and Ian Ayres, in their article, Economic Rationalesfor
Mediation,"9 provide a framework for analyzing this question. They explore the
benefits of mediators in resolving disputes. The principal benefit that they identify
arises from the fact that mediators talk, separately, with the parties to the dispute.
As a result, they are able to elicit and manipulate information that the parties
would otherwise hold private. This ability to elicit information derives from the
mediator's ability to talk to the parties one at a time and in the process to make
certain commitments about how and when certain private information will be
shared.110

107.
See Miller, supra note 105, at 435 ("Since 1978, the pressing need for
efficiency in the prosecution of Chapter 11 cases has resulted in a continuing erosion of the
principle of separation ofjudicial and administrative functions.").
108.
See id.; cf Korobkin, supra note 13, at 721 ("Because the participants'
varied grievances typically reflect conflicting and fundamentally incommensurable values,
bankruptcy law provides a forum for an ongoing debate in which diverse values can be
expressed and sometimes recognized."). As Korobkin puts it:
[B]ankruptcy rules structure the ensuing discourse, not only specifying
particular occasions for debate, but providing a larger context in which
participants in financial distress may contribute toward defining the aims
of the estate as enterprise. In essence, bankruptcy rules create the
discursive space in which the enterprise may realize its nature.
Id. at 775. Korobkin sees the judge as central to this discourse: "In arguing its case for or
against special treatment, the creditor and other parties in interest offer for the court's
consideration competing versions of what should be of value to the estate as
enterprise....[T he court must decide between incommensurable visions of what the estate
shall exist to do." Id. at 778-79; see also GROSS, supra note 13, at 237-39 ("The contextual
model does not require that the Bankruptcy Code be revamped from start to finish. It does
free up judges to use their equitable powers.").
109.
Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic Rationalesfor Aediation,
80 VA. L. REV. 323 (1994).
110.
See id. at 326:
Sequential caucusing is uniquely mediative: arbitrators generally do not
conduct ex parte meetings with parties and negotiation necessarily
requires the parties to meet together. By shuttling back and forth
between meetings with individual disputants, mediators can collect and
distribute private information. An economic rationale for mediation
centers on caucusing because it is here that the mediator most clearly
controls the flow of information between the disputants. Although our
title refers to "economic rationales for mediation," probably a more
illuminating description would be "economic rationales for mediative
caucusing."
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If, however, the benefit of mediation is the ability to hold sequential
meetings with the parties, then a judge is uniquely ill-suited to perform this
function. Ethical constraints on judges prohibit ex parte contacts between judges
and litigants."' Judges must meet with the parties as a group, and are not,
therefore, in a position to break down the information barriers inherent in private
negotiation. Instead, the bankruptcy judge is limited to a role that is one-half judge
and one-half facilitator. The judge has a limited number of tools to encourage
settlements, and chief among these is the use of strategic hand-tipping to get the
parties to settle. This facilitation is not worthless. The facilitator might help the
parties get past hurt feelings and conduct discussions among the parties so that all
players have an opportunity to speak.
The facilitator may probe the parties'
2
positions and establish an agenda."
Adopting such a facilitative role may have costs, however. If mediation
fails, the bankruptcy judge will be called upon to decide the dispute that she is
facilitating. Thus any hand-tipping by the judge during negotiation (in the absence
of a full record and without the procedural protections associated with a trial on
the merits) will likely constrain the judge when the time comes to render a
decision. As a result, such pretrial facilitation may impair the judge's role as an
adjudicator." 3
3. Adjudicating in the Shadow ofMuddy Rules
To summarize, Carol Rose's abuse-based approach to muddy rules
focuses not on what the judge does with his or her discretion, but on the effect that
such discretion is likely to have on the parties to transactions that are negotiated in
the shadow of the open-textured rule. However, this view of the role of muddy
rules has implications for judges as well. The role of the judge that should be
envisioned by judges themselves is not one that is purely minimalist,
administering clear statutory mandates and exercising minimal discretion. Neither
is it the maximalist mediative role envisioned by Korobkin.' Instead, the efforts
of the judge should be focused on spotting and deterring abuse. The next question,
then, is how should bankruptcy "abuse" be defined?

111.
112.

See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (1990).
See NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. MCEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY,

AND PRACTICE 9 (1989); see also Brown & Ayres, supra note 109, at 324 n.5 (citing
numerous authorities, including STEPHEN P. DOYLE & ROGER S. HAYDOCK, WITHOUT THE
PUNCHES: RESOLVING DIsPuTES WITHOUT LITIGATION, 88-92 (1991); HOWARD RAIFFA, THE
ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 108-09 (1982); LINDA R. SINGER, SETTLING DIsPUTEs:

CONFLICT RESOLUTION INBUSINESS, FAMILIES, AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 20 (1990)).

113.

See Judith Resnick, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 374, 428 (1982)

("Having supervised case preparation and pressed for settlement, judges can hardly be

considered untainted if they are ultimately asked to find the facts and adjudicate the merits
of a dispute.") (citation omitted). Many of the benefits of mediation can be obtained by
utilizing court annexed mediation, without impairing the role of the judge as an adjudicator.
114.
See Korobkin, supra note 13, at 775, 778-79.
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C Judicious Deployment ofMud-The Role of the Judge in Business and
ConsumerBankruptcy Cases
If muddy rules create an opportunity for judicial decision-making, and
judges are tasked with preventing abusive or opportunistic behavior (either
through judicial decision or bargaining in the shadow of a judicial decision), then
the next question is what constitutes abuse in bankruptcy cases. In this section, I
seek to define the judicial role in terms of the various bankruptcy abuses that
might arise. This inquiry proceeds in three stages. First, I will look to the structure
of the statute and the legislative history to describe the broad purposes of the
Bankruptcy Code. In this regard, I seek to identify the least common statutory
denominator-a purpose of the statute upon which both proceduralists and
traditionalists can agree." 5 Traditionalists might wish the statute to do more, but
proceduralists, at least those who work from the weak version of the proceduralist
"should not," should be comfortable with this minimal statutory goal. Second, I
will define abuse in light of this broad purpose, and third, I will look at the
existing deployment of open-textured rules in the Bankruptcy Code to see if it is
consistent with this definition of abuse.
1. The Purposeof the Statute-BusinessBankruptcy
The precise legislative purpose behind the Bankruptcy Code's business
bankruptcy provisions has been hotly debated, but there are certain areas of broad
agreement that can be identified in the legislative history and in the statute as
enacted.
a. Legislative History

At the very least, the Bankruptcy Code seeks to facilitate reorganizations

that preserve the going concern value of businesses." 6 In so doing, it was thought,
jobs and asset values would be preserved. As the House Report to the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 states:
The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation
case, is to restructure a business's finances so that it may continue to
operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and
produce a return for its stockholders. The premise of a business
reorganization is that assets that are used for production in the
industry for which they are designed are more valuable than those
same assets sold for scrap. Often, the return on assets that a business
can produce is inadequate to compensate those who have invested in
115.
It is important not to overstate the amount of agreement. While both will
agree that if the size of the pie can be increased, it should be, the agreement breaks dom
when it becomes necessary to balance distributional choices against the size of the pie.
116.
Going concern value is generally defined as the value of the business in
excess of the value of its constituent parts if sold of piece by piece. See MICHAEL GERBER.
MARcIA GOLDSTEIN, LARRY GoTrresMAN & EDWARD JANGER, Bus[NEss REORGANtZATONS

76-77 (2d ed. 2000).
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the business. Cash flow problems may develop, and require
creditors of the business, both trade creditors and long-term lenders,
to wait for payment of their claims. If the business can extend or

reduce its debts, it often can be returned to a viable state. It is more
economically efficient to reorganize than to liquidate, because it
preserves jobs and assets." 7
For the proceduralist, Congress saw reorganization as wealth maximizing
because it allows assets to be used in the most efficient manner. For the
traditionalist, by preserving jobs, reorganization allows people to continue to work
in the positions for which they were trained (saving the cost of retraining), and by
continuing production, it allows assets to continue to be used in the manner for
which they were designed. But the traditionalist goals are reached by way of a
proceduralist justification. Reorganizations are desirable because they save jobs
and preserve business entities, but jobs are to be saved and entities preserved
because to do so would be efficient.
b. The Bankruptcy Code
The Code, like the legislative history, has elements which support both
the proceduralist and traditionalist visions. On the one hand, a number of elements
of the Code seem clearly addressed to alleviating financial distress:
* First, the automatic stay"' enjoins all efforts by individual
creditors to collect on pre-petition debt. This has the effect of
stopping the race of diligence, under which individual creditors
proceed by exercising their state law remedies to dismember
the debtor. By stopping individual debt collection, the various
creditors are given an opportunity to determine, collectively,
whether the debtor is worth more as a going concern or sold off
piece by piece.

*

Second, the sections of the Code which permit the debtor to use
or sell property of the estate in the ordinary course of
business19 and borrow money post-petition120 facilitate the

continuation of the business while the creditors determine
whether or not there is going-concern value to be protected.
*

Third, class voting,' which allows majorities of creditor
classes to bind dissenting class members, and the cram-down
provisions,' 2 which allow the bankruptcy court to confirm a
plan of reorganization over the objection of a dissenting class,
limit the power of holdouts.

117.
118.
119.

H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977) (citations omitted).
See I I U.S.C. § 362 (1994, Supp. IV 1998 & Supp. V 1999).
See 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1994).

120.

See 11 U.S.C. § 364 (1994).

121.
122.

See IIU.S.C. §§ I126(c), (d) (1994).
See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1994).
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*

Fourth, the absolute priority rule ensures that non-bankruptcy
entitlements are respected in bankruptcy.

o

Finally, the best interest of the creditor test operates as a
protection to the pre-petition creditors by ensuring that they can
block a plan of reorganization if it offers them a less favorable
return than they could obtain if the debtor were to liquidate.t

By contrast, a number of aspects of current bankruptcy lav favor the
traditionalist view without retaining the close tie to the goal of efficiency. A
number of them are judge-made, and can be summed up in the concept that the
debtor should be given some breathing room to rearrange its affairs.
o

One aspect of this breathing space, which is clearly
redistributive, was affirmed by the Supreme Court's decision in
Timbers.'24 In that case, the court applied a plain language
reading to the statute, and held that a debtor need not pay
interest during
the pendency of the case to undersecured
12
creditors. 5

o

Second, the debtor's exclusive period to propose a plan of
reorganization allows the debtor to maintain control of the debtrestructuring process for a brief period. 126 In the hands of a
number of judges, it has become common to extend the
exclusive period routinely until a plan can be proposed and
confirmed. 27 This may limit the ability of the creditors to

123.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7). The Supreme Court's recent decision in Bank of
Am. Nat'l Trust and Say. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S. 434 (1999), also
suggests that the Court may be thinking in proceduralist terms. Courts have been divided
over the last five years over the continued vitality of the so-called "new value" exception to

the "absolute priority rule" contained in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b). See 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S.
at 441-43. The issue was whether a court could confirm a plan of reorganization over the
objection of an impaired class of unsecured claims, where the old equity owners obtained
an interest in the reorganized debtor in return for a post-petition contribution ofcapital. See
id. at 443. The Supreme Court held that a new value plan could not be confirmed where the
only parties given an opportunity to bid on the new equity were the old owners. See id. at
454-55. The case suggests that the Supreme Court shares the proceduralist desire to use
market mechanisms to ensure that the creditors obtain the highest possible return on their
claims.
124.
United Say. Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., 484 U.S.
365 (1988); see supranote 91 and accompanying text.
125.
See id. at 375. The effect of the Timbers ruling is to significantly reduce the
cash outlay required to keep the debtor operating during the course of the bankruptcy case.
It increases the burden of bankruptcy on secured creditors, both by reducing the payments
to them during the pendency of the case, and by increasing the likelihood that foreclosure
will be further delayed.
126.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (1994) (120-day exclusive period).
127.
See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, CorporateGovernment in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 669,
693, 717 n.177 (1993) (finding, in a 1993 study of reorganizations of public companies, that
in 34 of 43 cases studied, exclusivity was extended for the duration of the case). For
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expose the company to the market, 28 but it may also help the
judge to limit the effect of unreasonable creditor behavior.
"

Third is the case law under § 365, which allows a debtor to
compel a non-debtor to perform its obligations under a contract
performing its
with the debtor, even though the debtor is not
1 29
own pre-petition obligations under the contract.

*

Fourth, the presumption against appointing a trustee in Chapter
11 cases gives the debtor significant
leverage over creditors
130
during the early stages of a case.

On the one hand, this quick review of the broad structure of the
Bankruptcy Code and of its legislative history might appear inconclusive
regarding the "purpose" of the statute. However, neither the proceduralist nor the
traditionalist would dispute that one goal of the statute is to encourage cooperation
among creditors, at least for the purpose of determining the highest and best use of
the debtor's assets.' As Baird has noted, the principal obstacle to such an
outcome is unilateral action by creditors to enhance their recovery at the expense

examples of cases where exclusivity was extended, see In re AMKO Plastics, Inc., 197 B.R.
74, 77 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1996) (finding adequate cause for extending exclusivity where
debtor instituted "an extensive turn-around program" (to which creditors did not object)
because debtor would not be in a "position to propose a plan to its creditors.. until the
results of the turn-around manifest[ed] themselves"); In re Gibson & Cushman Dredging
Corp., 101 B.R. 405, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding adequate cause for extending
exclusivity where creditors were "recalcitrant" and unwilling to negotiate with debtor about
plan of reorganization and there was no "danger of dissipation of assets to the creditor's
detriment").
128.
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b). The Supreme Court's recent decision in the
203 N. LaSalle case may go a long way toward limiting the benefits of an extension of
exclusivity, as a new value plan may not be confirmable under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1994)
unless the exclusive period has been terminated. See generally 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship,
526 U.S. 434.
129.
See Data-Link Sys., Inc. v. Whitcomb & Keller Mortg. Co. (In re Whitcomb
& Keller Mortgage Co.), 715 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1983); In re Gunter Hotel Assoc., 96 B.R.
696, 700 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988). Under these cases, the debtor may be able to stay in
business by compelling non-debtors to perform their contract obligations, even though the
debtor may not, pre-petition, have complied with all of the conditions precedent to that
performance.
130.
Compare In re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d 1217, 1218 (3d Cir. 1989)
(appointing a trustee where incumbent management had been shown to have wasted assets
of the debtor), with In re Crescent Beach Inn, Inc., 22 B.R. 155, 159 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982)
("[S]ome degree of mismanagement exists in virtually every insolvency case."). The fact
that trustees are only infrequently appointed gives incumbent management significant
power in the early stages of a bankruptcy case. Note, however, that in most large
bankruptcy cases, incumbent management is replaced at some point in the case, whether or
not a trustee is appointed. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 127, at 727.
131.
The disagreement arises over whether encouraging cooperation should be
limited to conquering the so-called collective action problem or should go further.
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of the creditor body. 132 All of the Code sections described above, which are
described as supporting the proceduralist view, serve this end.
2. The Role ofthe Judge-BusinessBankruptcy
a. Abuse Defined
Even if one accepts the divided viev of the bankruptcy world, it is
striking to note that neither a proceduralist nor a traditionalist would contest that
the essential role of the bankruptcy judge in a business case is, at the very least, to
identify and control inefficient unilateral debt collection by creditors and
inefficient use of the bankruptcy process to continue a doomed business by
debtors. Inefficient unilateral debt collection is not "abusive" in any moral or
ethical sense; it is not abusive for a secured creditor to seek to enforce her
collection rights by asking the bankruptcy court to lift the stay. It may, however,
be abusive in the context of a collective bankruptcy proceeding. For example, an
oversecured creditor may choose to foreclose on its collateral and shut the debtor
down, even though the debtor is worth more as a going concern. Such unilateral
behavior may lead to deadweight loss.'
The proceduralist would argue that the bankruptcy judge's role should be
limited to the prevention of such abuse, and the proceduralist paradigm of the bad
restaurant would suggest that the presence of thick markets and market discipline
would make creditor abuses rare; as such, they would focus on debtor abuse. By
contrast, the traditionalist would assume thin markets and a greater role for the

judges in preventing creditor abuse and would find debtor abuse of the system
unlikely. If one assumes, however, that judges are able to determine what type of
case and what type of behavior are before them, both proceduralists and
traditionalists should be able to agree on the following basic principles:
1.

132.
133.

The role of judges is to detect abusive (i.e., inefficient, noncooperative) behavior, such as:
a.

debtors using bankruptcy strategically to capture value
from creditors;

b.

creditors using leverage to extort preferential treatment
during the bankruptcy;

See Baird, supra note 33, at 183-84.
As one early reader of this Article asked:
Why is it abusive for the secured creditor to say: "I am entitled to be
paid full value today. If you pay me today, I will go away. If you don't
pay me, I vill not cooperate in anything that defers me because it
necessarily exposes me to risk of nonpayment later through devaluation
of my collateral.
E-mail from Ronald Mann, Professor of Law, University of Michigan, to Ted Janger
(September 17, 2000) (on file vith Author).
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C.

2.

3.

creditors using leverage to endanger an efficient
reorganization in order to extort a larger share of the
debtor's reorganized value.
Creditor abuse is more likely in cases where:
a.
b.
C.

markets are thin;"'
35
creditors are numerous and diffuse;'

b.

creditors are few;' 37

c.

all claimants are present and active in the case.

important claimants, such as diffuse tort or trade
claimants, are not active in the bankruptcy.
Debtor abuse is more likely in cases where:
a.
markets are thick;' 36

Thus, if one is applying the weak version of the proceduralist "should
not," bankruptcy judges should gauge their involvement in bankruptcy cases on
whether markets are likely to be functioning well or poorly with regard to a
particular debtor. Where markets are functioning well, there is little need for the
bankruptcy judge to force a cooperative solution. After all, valuation questions
should be straightforward for the parties to resolve and the deadweight loss
associated with failure is likely to be small. By contrast, however, where markets
are not functioning well, either because of information problems, illiquid assets,
assets that are difficult to value, or widely disbursed creditors, the judge should be
prepared to become more involved.
The Bankruptcy Code, as presently written, can easily accommodate
judging focused on inefficient, non-cooperative behavior. If one looks at the rules
intended to enforce cooperation, discussed above, they are all muddy rules which
turn on the same two questions: (1) whether the debtor has going concern value
that needs to be protected (i.e., is the debtor using bankruptcy to extort value from
creditors); and (2) whether the creditor is seeking to use the suit to enhance its
recovery at the expense of a reorganization that is reasonably in prospect, The
questions of lifting the stay, extending exclusivity, compelling assumption or
rejection of an executory contract, and confirming a plan over the objection of
creditor class all require the judge to determine whether unilateral creditor action
(foreclosing, proposing a competing plan, or breaching a contract, for example) by
an individual creditor will harm the estate and whether, on the other hand,
pursuing the reorganization will work harm on the creditors.
134.
135.

This gives important creditors extra leverage.
On the one hand, this may give certain imporant creditors the ability to

extract value from more diffuse unrepresented creditors, but it may also give rise to the
possibility of an alliance between the debtor and an important creditor at the expense of the

other creditor.
136.
137.

There is less need for reorganization procedures.
There are few obstacles to negotiation outside of bankruptcy.
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On the debtor side, the Code will not allow a debtor to stay in bankruptcy

unless there is reorganization value to be preserved. If there is no value to be
protected, the judge may, for example, lift the stay and allow the creditor to
foreclose, or even dismiss the case."' On the creditor side, creditors cannot use
their leverage to extort a better distribution by threatening the reorganization
effort. Lift-stay motions,' 39 motions to dismiss, motions to extend exclusivity,""
and plan confirmation a2 all require the judge to address these two fundamental
questions at various stages in the case, and in so doing, allow the judge to focus on
these potential abuses. If there is value to be protected, the judge should leave the
stay in effect, continue exclusivity, give the debtor time to decide whether to
assume or reject contracts, and so on. In short, the judge should encourage

cooperation among the creditors where cooperation will preserve asset value. By
contrast, if there is no value to be protected, the court should allow the piecemeal
liquidation of the debtor. In each case, the abuse is inefficient, non-cooperative (or
opportunistic) behavior,4 3In each of these cases, an open-ended rule is used to allow
the judge to identify it.
b. Revisiting the Proceduralist "Cannot"
Viewed in this light, the Bankruptcy Code, as currently drafted, contains
a fairly sophisticated deployment of open-textured rules predicated on the idea of
competent judges who are able to detect abuse. To the extent that the
proceduralists who follow the weak version of the proceduralist "should not"
object to this use of muddy rules to allow the judge to enforce cooperation, their
objection cannot be based solely on the desire to avoid redistribution. If competent
judges follow the principles stated above in an even-handed manner, the
bankruptcy system will operate solely to correct the market imperfection created
by the collective action problem inherent in state debtor/creditor law.
The proceduralist objection appears instead to be based on the
proceduralist "cannot"--the belief that judges will not be able to fulfill their
assigned role. They will be unable to value assets or gauge the prospects for
138.

See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1994, Supp. IV 1998 & Supp. V 1999); 11 U.S.C.

§1112(b) (1994).
139.
See I1 U.S.C. § 362(d).
140.

See 11 U.S.C. § 1112.

141.
142.

See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d).
See II U.S.C. § 1129.

143.
In this context, "inefficient" must be judged against the background of what
the statute requires. For example, some judges might conclude that a debtor who is unable
to pay interest on undersecured claims is engaging in "debtor" abuse. Here, however, it
would be inappropriate to lift the stay because the Timbers rule prohibits it. See United Say.
Ass'n. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 372, 382 (1988). As noted
above, this Article seeks to bracket redistribution contained in the statute, and focus, to the
extent possible, not on what the rule should be, but upon whether it should be muddy or
crystalline. To put it another way, whether or not one thinks that the Timbers rule is wrong
does not alter the analysis of whether the rules for lifting the automatic stay should be clear
or muddy.
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reorganization. Markets may be imperfect, but judges will always be worse.
Judges, the proceduralists would argue, will virtually always be a second-best
alternative to markets. By contrast, the traditionalist fondness for the current
scheme is based on the view that judges are capable of the task assigned to them,
3. The Role ofthe Judge-ConsumerBanknptcy
a. Statutory Goals
The debate between traditionalists and proceduralists (and this Article so
far) has focused on business cases. This is due, at least in part, to the fact that
relatively little judicial time is spent on most consumer cases. As Karen Gross has
noted:
At a 95% level of statistical reliability, business Chapter 7 cases
occupied 40 minutes per case of judicial time, whereas nonbusiness
Chapter 7 cases occupied 10 minutes of time per case. On average,
judges spent 38 minutes on each Chapter 13 case. Judges spent on
average 456 minutes [seven and one-half hours] on each Chapter 11
4
case, with the amount of time increasing with the size of the case.'
Moreover, the goals of consumer bankruptcy are different. In business
cases, the goal is to preserve going concern value that inheres in a business
enterprise. When individuals file for bankruptcy, except those rare individuals
whose personal affairs are inextricably intertwined with their business, going
concern value is not an issue. Instead, the goals are to give the honest but
unfortunate debtor a fresh start and to ensure equality of distribution among
similarly situated creditors.'45 The questions that must be posed are (1) what must
144.
GRoss, supra note 13, at 132; see also Peter Alces, Book Review: Failure
and Forgiveness: Rebalancingthe Bankruptcy System, 15 BANKR. DEV. J. 383, 386 (1999)
(reviewing GRoss, supra, note 13).
145.
A number of citations to the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act support the conclusion that the purpose of the Act is to give honest but unfortunate

debtors a fresh start:
The result of the increase in consumer debt has been a corresponding

increase in the number of consumers who have overburdened themselves
with debt. Often, these consumers are able to keep up with their
obligations in normal times, but have saved very little for emergencies
or unexpected events. When a family member takes seriously ill or when
the breadwinner is laid off from his job, a financial crisis ensues. In
many cases, a young family of two, both working, incur a large amount
of debt. If the wife stops working because of pregnancy, the family loses
nearly half of its income, and has an extra member to feed and shelter.

The family will go deeper and deeper into debt to support themselves,
until finally the roof falls in.
The vast majority of consumer financial crises are of these
kinds. Aggressive advertising and sales techniques by the consumer
credit industry, many of whose members rely more on quantity of loans
than on quality to make a profit, add to the problems young families
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a debtor do in order to earn a fresh start; and (2) how should the debtor's
possessions be allocated as among the various creditors and between the creditors
and the debtor's fresh start? The consumer bankruptcy system offers two options
to the debtor. The debtor may choose Chapter 7, where the debtor commits all of
his or her non-exempt assets to payment of creditors in return for a discharge and
the right to keep all post-petition wages, or the debtor may choose Chapter 13 and
commit all disposable income for three to five years to the payment of creditors in
return for a fresh start and the right to retain non-exempt assets.
b. Defining Abuse
Abuse on the creditor side is concerned with attempts to violate the
principal of equality of distribution and attempts to interfere with the debtor's
fresh start.146 Abuse on the debtor side is focused on attempts to secret assets or to
avoid paying creditors where the debtor has the ability to do so. 4" However, if
Karen Gross's numbers are correct about how much time judges spend on Chapter
7 cases, the judge will have virtually no interaction with the case other than to sign
the discharge order. Similarly, thirty-eight minutes per Chapter 13 case will allow
time for the judge to hold a confirmation hearing and handle one or two lift-stay
motions or plan-modification hearings. In the vast majority of consumer cases, the
bankruptcy judge will have little or no substantive interaction with the case. What
encounter. When the crises finally erupt, the experience of the industry
in collecting from overburdened debtors allows it an enormous
advantage against the inexperienced and generally distraught consumer.
Harsh collection practices heaped on top of already serious financial
problems often result in ill health, family strain and divorce. Bankruptcy
often provides the only remedy. Thus, the number of bankruptcies has
risen over 2000 percent in the past 30 years. The rise has paralleled the
rise in the amount of consumer credit outstanding.
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 116 (1977) (citations omitted).
Some consumer debtors are unable to avail themselves of the relief
provided under Chapter 13. For these debtors, straight bankruptcy is the
only remedy that will enable them to get out from under the debilitating
effects of too much debt. The purpose of straight bankruptcy for them is
to obtain a fresh start, free from creditor harassment and free from the
worries and pressures of too much debt. Unfortunately, the current
Bankruptcy Act, last revised at a time when the consumer credit industry
was in its infancy, does not provide consumer debtors with adequate
relief.
The two most important aspects of the fresh start available
under the bankruptcy laws are the provisions of adequate property for a
return to normal life, and the discharge, with the release from creditor
collection attempts. Current law is deficient in both of these areas. H.R.
8200 offers consumer debtors significant protections in and after straight
bankruptcy that are not now available, and remedies the inadequacies of
current law.
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 125 (1977).
146.
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §524(c) (1994).
147.
See supra note 145.
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this indicates, more than anything else, is that relatively few creditors find it worth
their while to raise objections in bankruptcy cases. Most of the time, the stakes are
simply not high enough. 4
c. Practical Limits on Judicial Involvement
Judges simply don't spend much time on consumer cases. Debtors cannot
afford to pay their lawyers to appear at contested hearings, and generally, even if a
creditor wins, there is not likely to be much in the way of recovery. If there is no
money to pay the creditor, and no prospect, then there is no reason for the creditor
to object to discharge even if the debtor's behavior was culpable. Thus, under the
law as currently constituted, honest but unfortunate debtors get a discharge but so
do some dishonest debtors. It is simply too costly to identify the dishonest ones,
and little is to be gained by creditors from doing so. Second, most consumer cases
simply are not that complicated. Most debtors have only a few important creditors,
a few important assets-the house, the car, and a job. To the extent that creditors
have reliable information about the extent of the debtor's holdings and the extent
of other claims against the debtor, there are not significant obstacles to bargaining.
d. Crystals and Mud in Consumer Bankruptcy
For the most part, crystalline rules would therefore appear to be
appropriate. Judicial involvement is only really necessary in one of three
situations: (1) where the debtor is lying about the non-existence of assets or
148.
See Elizabeth Warren, The Bankruptcy Crisis, 73 IND. L.J. 1079, 1087-88
(1998). As Professor Warren has noted:
The microdata suggest that the people who file for bankruptcy generally
are those who need it.... In the early 1990s, for example, the typical
family filed for bankruptcy with an annual combined income of about
$21,200 (in 1997 dollars), compared with a median family income of
about $42,400 (in 1997 dollars) for those not in bankruptcy. For many,
their incomes represented a sharp drop over the preceding year as they
coped with unemployment, downsizing, and self-employment as
independent contractors. At the same time, their debts were staggering,
far outstripping debt loads for most Americans. The ratio of consumer
debt-to-income (which omits home mortgage debt), shows that at the
median these debtors owed more than their annual income to doctors,
hospitals, credit card issuers, finance companies, and other consumer
lenders. On average, they owed so much in short-term, high-interest debt
that every fifth paycheck would have to be used exclusively for interest
payments on their debts just to stay even. If they could not afford to give
up one paycheck every five weeks, then they would simply fall deeper
into debt even if they never incurred another doctor's bill or another
credit card charge or picked up any new rocks.
Id.; see also TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ETAL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY
AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 111 (1989) [hereinafter SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE
FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS]; Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook,
Consumer Debtors Ten Years Later: A Financial Comparison of Consumer Bankrupts

1981-1991, 68 AM.

BANKR.

L.J. 121, 128 tbl.1 (1994).
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income; (2) where the debtor has secreted assets pre-petition or is secreting them
post-petition; and (3) where the creditor is endangering the debtor's fresh start.
The deployment of muddy-open ended rules should be, and is, therefore,
somewhat different in consumer cases.
In Chapter 7 cases, debtors get their discharge. The principal occasion for
bargaining is between the debtor and his principal secured creditors over whether
or not he can keep the car or the house' 49 and with unsecured creditors over
reaffirmations. 5 Thus, one would hope to see muddy rules where the goal is to
govern the behavior of debtors and creditors, and that more or less, is what we
find. Rules regarding denial of discharge require a finding of debtor culpability by
the judge. Either the judge must conclude that the debtor lied to creditors or to the

court or that somehow the discharge would constitute a substantial abuse.'
Othenvise, the debtor receives a global discharge. Similarly, with the exception of
alimony and support, particular debts will be discharged unless the debtor has

engaged in criminal or fraudulent behavior of some sort' Pre-petition conduct is
governed by state and federal fraudulent conveyance law' 3 and perhaps the4
muddiest of all provisions in the Bankruptcy Code, the preference provisions.'5
With regard to creditor behavior, there is a great deal of confusion (as well there

should be) over appropriate reaffirmation practices.'

5

149.
See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS,
supra note 148, at 310 tbL124 (finding that cars were the most frequently listed collateral
for debtors' secured loans, with home mortgages coming in second). In many cases these
assets are subject to liens that either exceed the value of the asset or leave no value left over
for the estate after exemptions are applied. See Kenneth N. Klee, Reforming Consumer
Bankruptcy Law: Four ProposalsRestructuringIndividualDebts, 71 AM. BANKR. U. 431,
446 (1997). Klee describes the typical consumer bankruptcy case as follows:
If past is prologue, of the one million-plus individual bankruptcy cases
that will be filed in 1997, about seventy percent will be individual
Chapter 7 cases and about thirty percent will be Chapter 13 cases. These
cases will average about eighteen creditors that are owed approximately
$51,000 in debt, more than twice the average income of the debtors....In
about ninety-six percent of the cases the debtors will have no nonexempt
property.
Id. at 445-46.
150.
Which are rarely a good deal for the debtor, and must be supported by an
attorney affidavit. If entered into pro se, they are subject to judicial scrutiny under II
U.S.C. § 524(c)(6)(A) (1994).
151.
See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1994, Supp. IV 1998 & Supp. V 1999).
152.
See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1994, Supp. III 1997 & Supp. IV 1998).
153.
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a), 547 (1994, Supp. IV 1998 & Supp. V 1999).
154.
See 11 U.S.C. § 547.
155.
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 524(c) (1994). There are two areas of uncertainty wvith
regard to reaffirmation practice. The first area concerns whether a creditor can seek a
reaffirmation, and the second concerns whether a debtor can "reinstate" a secured loan
without reaffirming, post-discharge. These two issues illustrate nicely the distinction
between muddy and crystalline rules. The rules governing reaffirmation practices are very
muddy. The Code permits only "voluntary" reaffirmations. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994,
Supp. IV 1998 & Supp. V 1999). This muddy rule is aimed at creditor abuse.
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In Chapter 13 cases, the debtor pays creditors out of disposable income
rather than assets. In order to keep his or her assets, the payout in the Chapter 13
must exceed the payout that would have gone to the creditors if the assets had
been liquidated in a Chapter 7 case. Muddy rules come into play first with regard
to the valuation of assets that a debtor wishes to retain and second with regard to
the calculation of the debtor's budget, which determines the lifestyle that the
debtor will enjoy during the plan period. The most controversial "muddy" rule in
the consumer bankruptcy system, however, involves the Chapter 7 versus Chapter
13 choice. Under § 707(b), the judge may deny a debtor discharge where
discharge would constitute a substantial abuse. The principal form of "abuse" that
has been litigated concerns whether a debtor who seeks to discharge debts in
Chapter 7 has sufficient income to complete a Chapter 13 plan that would result in
substantial repayment to creditors.'56 Courts are divided over what constitutes

Reaffirmations of unsecured debt are generally not in the debtor's best interest and
endanger the debtor's fresh start. Because of the interaction between 11 U.S.C. §§ 524 and
362, the creditor must always face the possibility that overzealous efforts to seek a
reaffirmation will constitute a violation of the automatic stay. By contrast, while courts are
divided over whether a debtor can reinstate a secured loan post-discharge (i.e., prevent
foreclosure by keeping the loan current), compareIn re Bell, 700 F.2d 1053 (6th. Cir. 1983)
(no "installment redemptions"), with In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 1997) (allowing
reinstatement); In re Bellanger, 962 F.2d 345 (4th Cir. 1992) (prohibiting reinstatement),
the choice is between competing crystalline rules. Either reinstatement is allowed, or it is
not.
156.
Section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion or on a motion
by the United States trustee, but not at the request or suggestion of any
party in interest, may dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor under
this chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts if it finds that the
granting of relief would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of this
chapter. There shall be a presumption in favor of granting the relief
requested by the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (emphasis added). Circuit courts have set up various standards for
determining when ability to pay gives rise to substantial abuse of Chapter 7. See, eg., First
U.S.A. v. Lamanna (In re Lamanna), 153 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1998) ("Among the factors to
be considered in deciding whether a debtor is needy is his ability to repay his debts out of
[A] court would not be justified in concluding that a debtor is needy and
future earnings ....
worthy of discharge, where his disposable income permits liquidation of his consumer debts
with relative ease."); Komfield v. Schwartz (In re Komfield), 164 F.3d 778, 784 (2d Cir.
1999) ("The record depicts debtors with substantial ...income .... Most of the present debt
could have been avoided, and all of it can be repaid over time....This is a paradigm of the
case that Section 707(b) was designed for...."); Green v. Staples (In re Green), 934 F.2d
568, 572 (4th Cir. 1991) ("The debtor's relative solvency may raise an inference (of
substantial abuse]"); In re Krohn, 886 F.2d 123, 126 (6th Cir. 1989) ("In determining

whether to apply § 707(b) to an individual debtor, then, a court should ascertain from the
totality of the circumstances whether he is...'honest'...and whether he is 'needy'....
Among the factors to be considered in deciding whether a debtor is needy is his ability to
repay his debts out of future earnings."). Both the House and Senate versions of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999 create a presumption of abuse when an individual debtor's
monthly income exceeds IRS medians. See H.R. 833, 106th Cong. § 102(a)(2)(A)(i) (1999);
S.625, 106th Cong. § 102(a)(2)(A)(i) (1999).
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abuse," but one of the major factors considered is whether the debtor would have
been able to confirm a Chapter 13 plan that would have resulted in a substantial
repayment to creditors.-5 8 In any event, each muddy area appears to concern one of
the key abuses-secreting of assets and ability to pay. These statutory provisions
create an opportunity for a judge to examine behavior that could affect the
distribution to creditors, but in all cases, reexamination is likely only if a creditor
finds it worthwhile to object, and the assumption of the statute appears to be that
the judge will be capable of identifying abuse when it is presented.
e. Abuse and the Burden of Litigation in Consumer Cases
While abuse of the bankruptcy system will exist in consumer cases, any
theory of the role of the bankruptcy judge in consumer cases must recognize that
the number of actual judicial interventions into consumer cases is going to be, of
necessity, very small. As a result, statutory draftsmen must take care when
allocating the burden of litigation. Since most cases will not be litigated,
evidentiary presumptions will, in most cases, be dispositive. If abuse is presumed,
most debtors will not receive a discharge, and if the presumption is in favor of
discharge, then some abusive behavior will slip through the cracks.
Thus, the prescription for statutory drafting in consumer cases is one that
uses muddy rules in areas where abuse is expected, but which takes great care in
allocating the burden of litigation, because of the great risk of over-and
underinclusiveness which results from the small number of dollars at stake in
proportion to litigation expense.
D. Conclusion-Assuming Judicial Competence

In the Bankruptcy Code, muddy rules are used to allow a judge to
determine whether abusive behavior has occurred. If one views the judge as
competent, this use of muddy rules should be applauded both by the traditionalist
and by the proceduralist. Even in consumer cases, muddy rules will allow the
judge to examine abuse where the abuse is of sufficient financial importance to
make it worth a lawyer's time.5 9 In the next section, I examine whether altering
the assumption of judicial competence alters the manner in which muddy rules
should be used in the Bankruptcy Code.

157.
158.

See cases cited supra note 156.
See id.

159.

As noted in footnote 103 supra, the extent to which a muddy rule will

encourage judicial determination of a dispute turns not just on the amount of money at
stake. It may also be influenced by whether the rule is a property rule or a liability rule.

Because the entitlement holder can veto any behavior by the non-holder, the dispute can
only be resolved by consent of the right holder or judicial order. By contrast, liability rules
have the effect of reducing the amount at stake, and muddy liability rules further reduce the
amount at stake. For the most part, the rules discussed above, such as the automatic stay
and the discharge injunction, are inthe form of property rules.
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THE ASSUMPTION OF JUDICIAL COMPETENCE-THE

NON-IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROCEDURALIST "CANNOT"

Up to this point, this Article has proceeded from a perspective that
assumes judicial competence. The model bankruptcy statute described in the
previous section (1) identifies categories of abusive or opportunistic behavior; (2)
uses muddy rules as a mechanism for allowing the judge to identify and prevent
such behavior where it occurs; and (3) forces parties to bargain in the shadow of a
muddy rule and a "competent" judge capable of identifying inefficient
opportunistic behavior. Such opportunistic behavior may take a number of forms.
A creditor may be seeking to exploit its leverage over the debtor's business to
obtain a disproportionate recovery at the expense of other creditors. A debtor in a
business case might use the bankruptcy process to keep a non-viable business
alive. A creditor might use sharp practices to obtain a reaffirmation in a consumer
case, or a consumer debtor might secret assets or obtain a bankruptcy discharge
notwithstanding his ability to repay debts. We assumed, however, that the reason
for using muddy rules in areas of perceived abuse was that the bankruptcy judge
was capable of identifying such abuses when brought to her attention.
Proceduralists are deeply suspicious of this assumption. Baird expressly
casts doubt on the ability of a bankruptcy judge to distinguish debtors that are
likely candidates for reorganization from those that are not. He says:
While it is easy to observe those who lose jobs when a firm fails, it
is virtually impossible to identify with any specificity those who
indirectly gain from a new job when the failed firm's assets are
redeployed. Moreover, even if such information were at hand,
striking this balance would require overcoming one6 of the most
persistent and intractable problems of cognitive bias.
His skepticism is not, however, absolute. He notes that bankruptcy judges
"are less likely to let a debtor play for time and more likely to grant lift-stay
motions when an effective reorganization is not in prospect. Moreover, they have
become increasingly adventurous in invoking market mechanisms when those
markets exist.."161

Other proceduralist scholars have not shown Baird's moderation. 2
Judicial competence would seem at first to be crucial to any system that relies on
judges to make decisions. The obvious response to judicial incompetence would
be to shift responsibility to the legislature, using crystalline rules to prohibit
Baird, supra note 8, at 587; see sources cited supra note 63.
See Baird, supra note 8, at 588.
162.
See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAw 277 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); Alan Schwartz,
Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial
Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL. STUD. 271 (1992). As Eric Posner has noted, "Schwartz is most
160.
161.

explicit about the assumptions one must make about judicial competence. He points out that
identifying the value maximizing action in any contract is likely to require information that
is not available to the court." Eric A. Posner, A Theory of ContractLaw Under Conditions

ofRadical Judicial Error, 94 Nw. U.L. REv. 749, 753 (2000).
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certain well defined behaviors, while tolerating a significant amount of over- and
underinclusiveness.
However, if one considers the implications of Carol Rose's description of
the effect of muddy rules, this facile prescription of crystalline drafting as a
remedy for judicial incompetence loses much of its appeal. If one accepts, as Rose
suggests, that open-ended rules both allow judges to identify abuse and discourage
abusive behavior in bargaining situations, then judicial competence is not as
crucial.'63 In this section, I argue that relaxing the assumption of judicial
competence does not significantly alter the desired approach to statutory design.
Statutory draftsmen should continue to use open-textured rules in roughly the
same manner as they do when judicial competence is assumed. First, muddy rules
may enhance efficiency even if judges are not perfectly competent. Second,
muddy rules in the Bankruptcy Code, if placed at points where "abuse" is likely,
increase the cost of non-cooperative behavior, even when the decision-maker is
not competent at all.
A. Crystals,Mud andLimited JudicialCompetence
In a different context, Gillian Hadfield has argued that even where judges are
not perfectly competent, muddy standards may nonetheless be preferable to bright
line rules."6 Hadfield explores the effect of judicial competence on the ability of
judges to enforce contractual "good faith" clauses. She points out that contracting
parties, performing under contracts with gaps (i.e. not "fully specified" to use her
term) face a problem. Compliance with contracts is costly. In any joint venture,
the benefits of any efforts are shared, while the cost of such efforts are borne by
the party who makes the effort.'65 As a result, the joint efforts of the parties, in the
absence of an enforceable contract term, are likely to be suboptimal. The purpose
of a "good faith" clause, Hadfield points out, is to encourage such "optimal"
effort. Courts interpreting good faith clauses, however, may not be capable of
determining the optimal level of effort for a given type of contract. 6'
Hadfield asks whether courts, unable to determine with confidence the optimal
level of effort, should adopt bright line crystalline rules or muddy standards. To
do this, she models the effect of legal enforcement of good faith clauses on
behavior. Without a good faith clause, contracting parties determine their level of
effort based upon the expected benefit from each unit of effort, discounted by the
cost of such effort. When a good faith clause is present, the parties must
additionally consider the expected liability under the good faith clause. Additional
effort reduces the likelihood of liability. 67 Thus, so long as the cost of increased
effort is less than the reduced likelihood of contractual liability, enforcing good
163.
Though, as the discussion below will show, judicial even-handedness is
essential.
164.
Gillian K. Hadfield, Judicial Comptence and the Interpretation of
Incomplete Contracts,23 J. LEGAL STUD. 159 (1994).
165.
Id. at 167.
166.
Id. at 169-70.
167.
Id.at 168-69.
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faith clauses will increase the contracting party's effort above the suboptimal
level.
Under this model, if a court of limited competence adopts a bright line rule that
misses the mark (i.e. misidentifies the optimal level of effort for that particular
type of contract), the rule will either fail to encourage compliance or encourage
inefficiently high levels of compliance. For example, if the court sets the bright
line rule at a level below the level of effort the parties would expend in the
absence of the rule, then the rule will have no effect on behavior. If, by contrast,
the rule demands a level of effort so high that even assuming liability, the cost to
comply exceeds the expected liability, then the rule will lead to overcompliance,
or no contracting. If, instead, a standard is adopted, the effect will be to encourage
compliance in a broader range of contractual types and reduce the costs associated
63
with overcompliance when it occurs.'
Hadfield's conclusion has obvious implications for bankruptcy judges and
Congress. Inefficient unilateral behavior is likely when a debtor is insolvent, both
because a collective action problem gives creditors an incentive to dismember the
debtor, and diffuse small creditors are not in a position to monitor the debtor.
Hadfield's insight shows that the inability of judges to perfectly identify efficient
or inefficient reorganizations does not necessarily counsel a bright line rule. To
the contrary, the threat of judicial enforcement will help remedy the collective
action problem, and will work best if the legal norm is articulated as a muddy
standard.
Hadfield notes further that while some of the benefit of a muddy rule might be
overshadowed by the costs of litigation, the muddy rule will also affect behavior
in the vast majority of cases that are not litigated. In those cases, efficiency will
be gained without incurring the associated litigation cost.'69
B. JudicialIncompetence-A Cost-Based Theory ofJudicialRole
Hadfield assumes limited, if not perfect, judicial competence. In a recent
article, entitled A Theory of ContractLaw Under Conditions of RadicalJudicial
Error,171 Eric Posner goes further and articulates a role for judicial enforcement of
contracts based on litigation costs that completely deemphasizes the need for
accurate decision-making. Posner argues that even if one assumes that judges
cannot identify and punish opportunistic behavior in contractual relationships, 7
judicial decision-making can play a crucial role in encouraging cooperation among
contracting parties.
Posner suggests a paradox. On the one hand, "The traditional neoclassical paradigm of contractual behavior.. .assumes that people make contracts
because only legal sanctions will deter a party from cheating on a contract when it
168.
169.
170.

d.at 178-179.
Id. at 174.
Posner, supra note 162.

171.

See id. at 754 ("1 argue.. .that even if courts are radically incompetent,

people would still voluntarily enter legally enforceable contracts.").
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is profitable to do so,"'" and parties routinely insist on legally enforceable
agreements. However, business people do not appear to believe that legal

enforceability is sufficient to guarantee compliance with the contract. If parties
actually relied on judicial enforcement, much observed contracting behavior
would not occur. Merchants invest large amounts of time and effort augmenting
their commercial relationships with personal ones. "Business is almost always
conducted in a highly social manner."'" Posner blames judges:
Courts have trouble understanding the simplest of business
relationships.... Judges must be generalists, but usually they have
narrow backgrounds in a particular field of law, and they often owe
their positions to political connections rather than merit. Their
frequent failure to understand transactions is well documented. One
survey of cases involving consumer credit for example showed 7that
4
the judges did not even understand the concept of present value.1
This explains, according to Posner, why parties invest time in developing
reputation and networks of social relations. 75 If they cannot rely on judges to
enforce agreements accurately, they must instead turn to social networks and
social norms to encourage cooperation. However, while this explains corporate
golf outings, it does not explain why "[i]f they cannot rely on courts to enforce
contracts properly,
people so frequently take pains to ensure that their contracts
17 6
are enforceable."'
1. Cost-BasedJudging
As an answer to this riddle, Posner suggests that the parties who enter
into legally enforceable contracts recognize that even an uncomprehending court
can deter opportunistic behavior in contracting situations. According to Posner,
parties use contracts as a commitment device:
Parties can protect themselves ex ante by entering a legally
enforceable contract. But the protection does not result from the
ability of courts to punish the party that breaches.... It is assumed
that courts are not able to acquire the information that they would
need in order to determine liability and harm. The protection results
because the victim of the breach, if he cares about his reputation,

172.
Id. at 756.
173.
Id. at 757.
174.
Id. at 758 (citing Jeffrey E. Allen & Robert J. Staaf, 7he Nemus Between
Usury, "Time Price" and Unconscionability in Installment Sales. 14 U.C.C. LJ. 219
(1982)).
175.
While this is "an" explanation, it may not be "the" explanation. It is also
possible that, even with competent judges and a perfectly reliable legal system, the cost of
judicial enforcement of a contract might exceed the marginal cost of investments in social
and reputational networks. Nonetheless, Posner's thought exercise does help to identify a
social function for an imperfect judicial system.
176.
Id. at 758.
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can credibly threaten to inflict a mutual harm by bringing a negative
sum lawsuit.'77

In short, parties enter into legally binding contracts because legal
enforceability increases the cost of non-cooperative behavior. This increased cost
is not dependent on the court getting the right answer. It is driven instead by
litigation costs. According to Posner, parties will choose to make contracts legally
enforceable even when they believe judges to be incompetent so long as two
conditions hold: (1) the parties will be willing to bring a negative sum
(reputational) lawsuit in order to deter future breaches; and (2) each party can
increase its chance of winning by spending more on the lawsuit.' 78 When these
two conditions are satisfied, the victim of a breach can punish the breaching party
by bringing suit and can impose additional costs on the defendant by vigorously
prosecuting the lawsuit.'79
2. Competence, Bias, and Muddy Rules in Bankruptcy
This cost-based view of judicial enforcement has implications for
statutory drafting and the optimal use of crystals and mud in bankruptcy. While
Posner focuses on relational contracts, to the extent his assumptions carry over, his
insight will apply equally where the Bankruptcy Code and bankruptcy judges are
involved. Increased expenditure by litigating parties will increase the likelihood of
success in bankruptcy court. Good lawyering is good lawyering wherever it
occurs.
It is less clear, however, that parties will be willing to bring reputational
lawsuits in bankruptcy cases. Many debt contracts are not "relational." They
instead involve one-shot lending arrangements and no further relationship between
the creditor and the debtor, other than extracting payment. 8 While there is a well
developed literature on how secured credit, guarantees, and letters of credit may
have the effect of cementing the relationship between the debtor and the
creditor, 8 ' once the debtor is in bankruptcy, the relationship has generally broken
down, and the enhanced remedies accorded to secured creditors or others that

originally may have served to bind the debtor to the creditor will often increase the
leverage of the creditor in the context of insolvency. Moreover, the first-in-time
nature of state law debt collection devices forces the debtor/creditor relationship
into a contractual end-game-mode.
Bankruptcy law seeks to alter this characteristic of collection law.
Bankruptcy law generally and Chapter 11 in particular seek to replace the end177.
Id. at 759. A negative sum lawsuit is a lawsuit where the expected costs of
litigation exceed the case's expected value.
178.
See id. at 759-62.
179.
See id.
180.
Car loans are a good example.
181.
See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Verification Institutions in Financing
Transactions,87 GEO. L. J. 2225, 2249-52 (1999); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of
Secured Financing,86 COLUM. L. REv. 901, 904 (1986); see also Ronald J. Mann, The Role
ofLetters of Credit in Payment Transactions,98 MIcH. L. REv. 2494 (2000).
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game of state law debt collection with a collective proceeding, where the creditors
and the debtor must continue to deal with each other. So long as the debtor
remains in bankruptcy, the automatic stay prevents unilateral action and links the
creditor's recovery to the recovery of the creditors as a group. Thus creditors will
have an incentive, on the one hand, to appear willing to bring a reputational
lawsuit (seeking, perhaps, to lift the automatic stay) to enhance their bargaining
position in the bankruptcy, while on the other hand, they must recognize that the
costs will come out of their recovery." Similarly, the debtor's management
outside of bankruptcy has no incentive to cooperate with creditors, to protect the
value of assets, or to do anything other than leave and look for another job. Thus,
the effect of Chapter 11 is, again, to tie the future of key personnel to the
reorganization itself.l
Finally, while in many contexts, litigants with small
claims who are not repeat players may find that litigation costs swamp the value of
their claims, the committee structure of bankruptcy goes a long way toward
remedying this problem by aggregating the value of these claims.
Another aspect of bankruptcy practice that has frequently been remarked
upon is that the nature of bankruptcy cases has an unusual effect on the conduct of

bankruptcy lawyers. While bankruptcy lawyers seek a reputation as tough and

hard-nosed, bankruptcy lawyers also recognize that during the course of a
bankruptcy case, opponents in one dispute may be allies in a matter that comes up
later in the case. The lawyers are often repeat players with each other within the
case, and, more controversially, across cases." As a result, the lawyers also need
to develop reputations as straight shooters. Thus Chapter I1 both turns the parties

into repeat players and creates the need to be viewed as "tough" in a repeat game.
Both the parties and the attorneys do have an incentive to bring a reputational
lawsuit to establish this "toughness."

182.
Doug Baird points out that in bankruptcy many of the parties do not bear
their own litigation costs. Letter from Douglas G.Baird to Ted Janger (on file with author).
Oversecured creditors will be paid their attorney's fees as part of their secured claim,
creditors' committees expenses (including professional fees) are paid out of the estate, and
the debtor's counsel are paid out of the estate. This is not fatal. Litigation expenses of
oversecured creditors eat into their equity cushion. Litigation expenses of unsecured
creditors' committees come directly out of the recovery for unsecureds. By contrast, except
in the rare case where the debtor proves to be solvent at the end of the day, the debtor-inpossession (whether incumbent management or old equity or both) is litigating with other
people's money. This may suggest that, in the typical case, where the unsecured creditors
are the residual claimants, the litigating decision should rest with the unsecured creditors'
committee rather than the debtor.
LoPucki and Whitford have found that in large company bankruptcies,
183.
current management almost always loses control, but in small company bankruptcies
(which succeed less often), the owner-managers who are able to reorganize successfully
virtually never lose control. Compare LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 127, at 727, with
Lynn LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code?, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247,263-66 (1983).
184.
Nancy B. Rapoport, Our House, Our Rules: The Need for a Uniform Code
of BankruptcyEthics, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 45 (1998).

608

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:3

As such, muddy rules in bankruptcy appear to increase the cost of
unilateral action and encourage cooperation. This should be true regardless of
whether the judge is competent. The muddy bankruptcy rules identified above all
represent attempts to correct the end-game of state law debt collection. The
automatic stay, the exclusive period, and the limitation of the power of holdouts in
the plan confirmation process all govern whether a creditor will be able to opt-out
of the collective bankruptcy proceeding. If a judge is competent, he or she will be
charged with identifying inefficient unilateral behavior, and muddy rules will be
deployed in order to allow the judge to do so. If the judge is incompetent, but the
chance of winning is positively correlated with litigation expenditures,"' then the
effect of a muddy rule will be to increase the cost of unilateral behavior.
Since muddy rules increase the cost of unilateral behavior whether or not
the judge is competent, the important question becomes not, "Can the judge
identify abuse," but instead, "Has the legislature identified contexts in which
abuse is likely?" If the answer is yes, then a muddy rule will increase the cost of
abuse, regardless of whether the judge is competent. 86 Again, the logic of the
automatic stay is that it allows judges to sort inefficient unilateral debt collection
(i.e., where a more efficient collective solution is in prospect), and efficient
unilateral debt collection (i.e., where nothing is lost by allowing the creditor to
foreclose). In other words, the judge needs to determine whether the harm caused
to the creditor by delaying the foreclosure on the pizza parlor's ovens or
Chrysler's auto parts is outweighed by the benefit of giving the reorganization a
chance. By contrast, if the judge is thought to be incompetent, the rationale for an
open-ended rule shifts. Instead of using the judge as a filter, litigation costs are
used as a deterrent. Therefore, the question becomes whether the conduct
governed by the muddy rules is of the type where non-cooperative behavior needs
to be deterred.
If we return to our example of the encumbered pizza ovens and auto
parts, the question one must ask is whether the secured creditor is likely to use its
ability to shut down the business (by foreclosing on the pizza ovens or auto parts)
to the detriment of the creditor body as a whole. Under the litigation cost
approach, the rationale behind muddy rules for lifting the stay lies in the collective
action problem identified by Baird and Jackson, which arises out of the insolvency
common pool. If the race of diligence is inefficient, then the automatic stay makes
unilateral behavior more costly and thereby enhances efficiency.

185.
Which, by all accounts, it is. See Lynn M. LoPucki & Walter 0. Weyrauch,
A Theory of Legal Strategies,49 DUKE L.J. 1405 (2000); Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves"
Come Out Ahead: Speculation on Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95, 96
(1974).

186.
The crucial caveat here is that the judge's limitations as a decision-maker
must be evenhanded. If judges err on the side of the debtor as often as they err on the side
of the creditor, then the effect of the muddy rule will be to deter abuse, so long as the form
of abuse is correctly identified in the statute. By contrast, if judges are systematically
biased, then the result may be to encourage abuse by the favored party.
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The question is an empirical one. Does the race of diligence lead to
deadweight loss? If the answer is yes, then a muddy rule that deters inefficient
unilateral debt collection is a good thing even where the judge is incompetent.'
The proceduralist "cannot" does not mandate a wholesale limitation of judicial
discretion. Open-ended rules have a role even in a bankruptcy judicial system
where the decision-maker is viewed as flawed.
C JustifyingMandatoryMuddy Rules
Parties to a contract choose to make their promises legally enforceable.
Bankruptcy law, by contrast, is not "chosen" by the parties. The Bankruptcy Code
imposes mandatory terms on contracting parties that they probably didn't agree to
and may expressly have attempted to contract around.s Indeed Posner notes:
The value of a legally enforceable promise as a commitment device
depends on the freedom of parties to opt into or out of legal liability.
The ability to impose legal liability on a stranger without ex ante
consent would give people the ability to use courts strategically to
extract wealth from each other.1 9
While some courts have enforced contractual waivers of the automatic
stay, courts are divided on this point, and do not lightly permit contracting parties
to waive the benefits of the Bankruptcy Code, if they do so at all."' One might,
187.
Of course, one could simply prohibit unilateral creditor behavior entirely,
and do away with motions to lift stay under § 362(d). However, as noted above, just as
unilateral creditor behavior is not always inefficient, debtor behavior is not always efficient.
While perfect judicial sorting may not be possible, the threat of litigation costs raises the
threshold at which unilateral behavior becomes profitable, and therefore increases the
likelihood that it will be efficient.
188.
See Schwartz, supranote 10, at 1821-22; see also LoPucki, supra note 10.
189.
Posner, supra note 162, at 769.
190.
See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy
Paradigm, 77 TEX. L. REV. 515, 516 n.4 (1999), and authorities cited therein. To wit,
compare In re Atrium High Point Ltd. Partnership, 189 B.R. 599, 607 (Bankr. M.D.N.C.
1995) (recognizing that a prepetition debtor may waive the automatic stay); In re Jenkins
Court Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 181 B.R. 33, 36 (BankT. E.D. Pa. 1995) (same); In re
Powers, 170 B.R. 480, 482-83 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) (same); In re Cheeks, 167 B.R. 817,
818-19 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1994) (same); In re Club Tower L.P., 138 B.R. 307, 311 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1991) (same); In re Citadel Properties, Inc., 86 B.R. 275, 276 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1988), with In re Pease, 195 B.R. 431, 433 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1996) (refusing to enforce the
waiver of the automatic stay); Farm Credit, ACA v. Polk, 160 B.R. 870, 873-74 (M.D. Fla.
1993) (same); In re Sky Group Int'l, Inc., 108 B.R. 86, 88 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) (same).
The academic literature on this point is extensive. See eg., Edward S. Adams & James L.
Baillie, A PrivatizationSolution to the Legitimacy ofPrepetition Waivers of the Automatic
Stay, 38 ARiz. L. REV. 1 (1996); Daniel B. Bogart, Games Lanyers Play: Waivers of the
Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy and the Single Asset Loan Workout, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1117
(1996); Rafael Efrat, The Casefor Limited Enforceability of a Pre-Petition Waiver of the
Automatic Stay, 32 SAN DIEGO L. Rv. 1133 (1995); Robert K. Rasmussen, Free
Contracting in Bankruptcy at Home and Abroad, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF
CONTRACT (Francis Buckley ed., 1999); Marshall E. Tracht, Contractual Bankruptcy
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therefore, ask whether the benefits of muddy rules aren't swallowed by the costs
of making them mandatory. In other words, having worked from the weak version
of the proceduralist "should not," we must still respond to the strong version.
There are a number of responses to this question. First, one might argue
that a mandatory bankruptcy rule is only mandatory in the sense that it is a
mandatory incident of the debtor/creditor relationship. Posner suggests that the
function of legal enforceability of contracts is to encourage cooperation,"'
Mandatory bankruptcy rules could be viewed as a mere incident of enforceability.
This is only a partial response, however. Why not simply permit contracting
parties to freely elect between crystalline and muddy rules?
A second partial response is to look to Baird and Jackson's "creditor's
bargain" heuristic itself. One starts with a version of Rawls' original position, by
hypothesizing that all of the stakeholders in the debtor are locked in a room
together, but are denied knowledge of who they are.'92 They are then instructed to
craft a set of insolvency rules that will govern in the outside world. One can justify
many of the attributes of bankruptcy law using this device.' The question here is
when, under the assumption of judicial incompetence, will the parties choose to
create open-textured rules and thereby choose judicial resolution of disputes?
In this thought exercise, the hypothetical blindfolded stakeholder would
still choose to use open-textured rules in areas where there was a high probability
for opportunistic behavior by creditors. Under Hadfield's approach, a muddy rule
would be preferred with judges of limited competence. According to Posner, even
with an incompetent judge, muddy rules would be desirable. As far as the creditors
are concerned, the purpose of legal rules is to discourage abusive or noncooperative behavior-to affect the interaction among the creditors themselves.
From this perspective, even without "accurate" decision-making by a judge, a
statute which properly allocates open-textured and closed textured rules can still
operate to counteract the collective action problem faced in bankruptcy.
However, simply saying that some stakeholders would choose openended rules does not provide a justification for making those open-ended rules
mandatory. In order to justify mandatory open-ended rules, one must show that
there is something wrong with bargaining outside the Rawlsian veil of ignorance
that makes it impossible for parties to arrange the same contract in the real world
that they would negotiate in the idealized original position. Indeed, this is the view
articulated by Schwartz, Adler, and Rassmussen. They argue that rational

Waivers: Reconciling Theory, Practice,andLaw, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 301 (1997); see also
Michael St. Patrick Baxter, Prepetition Waivers of the Automatic Stay: A Secured Lender's
Guide, 52 Bus. LAW. 577 (1997) (offering guidance to secured lenders in the use of
prepetition waivers of the automatic stay); Bruce H. White, The Enforceability of PrePetition Waivers ofthe Automatic Stay, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Jan. 1997, at 26 (summarizing
the arguments for not enforcing prepetition waivers of the automatic stay).
191.
See supra notes 178-180 and accompanying text.
192.

See JOHN RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 130-50 (1971).

193.

The automatic stay and the best interests test are perhaps the best examples.
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stakeholders are perfectly capable of negotiating their own bankruptcy contracts,
and that bankruptcy law should merely function as a default rule."
The advocates of contract bankruptcy, however, ignore the collective
action problem. Just as creditors in the current world price debt and negotiate in
the face of existing bankruptcy law, creditors in a world without bankruptcy lav
would lend in the shadow of the race of diligence. Just as creditors have an
incentive at the time of insolvency to carve up the debtor's property, so creditors,
at the time they lend, have an incentive to fix their place in any such race. Granted,
the debtor has more leverage with creditors pre-bankruptcy, and may be able to
negotiate ex ante for the right to attempt reorganization. There is reason, however,
to believe that pre-bankruptcy contracting will simply yield the race of diligence,
without the race.
Whether or not this will be the case is an empirical question, but one
about which it is possible to have intuitions. For example, imagine that a principal
creditor negotiated not only for security, but for a waiver of the automatic stay.
Just to keep things simple, assume further that this was the first creditor of the
debtor, and all other lenders came later in time. If the various subsequent creditors
would incorporate the stay waiver into their credit risk decision and price their
own loan accordingly, then the provision is non-problematic. However, even with
this simple example, one can easily imagine creditors who will not accurately
respond to the increased risk. Employees do not generally run credit checks on
their employers. Prospective tort claimants do not even choose to enter into a
debtor/creditor relation. The taxing authority taxes based on income, not riskiness.
So even with this simple example, it is possible to imagine a subsidy to the debtor
and the advantaged creditor arising out of the enforceable stay waiver."' As such,
outside the "original position," it might not be possible for the debtor and creditors
to engineer the automatic stay, even though it might be the optimal rule.
If the advantaged lender (i.e., the one who negotiates for a stay waiver)
lends after the debtor has already borrowed from others, the problems become
greater. Many creditors will not be able to exit the credit relationship or adjust
their interest rate in response to the stay waiver. It gets complicated quickly,' but,
again, there is reason to believe (1) that creditors, ex ante, would choose at least
this one mandatory open-ended bankruptcy rule, even if they significantly
distrusted bankruptcy judges, and (2) that it would be difficult or impossible to
obtain this rule through negotiation. Making the automatic stay mandatory, on this
theory, improves on the market.
The argument from social policy bypasses the original position and
simply recognizes that the goal of the bankruptcy statute, at least in business cases,
194.
See generally Schwartz, supra note 10; Adler, supra note 11; Rasmussen,
supranote 11; Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 11.
195.
As noted previously, Rasmussen suggests that tort claimants might be

accorded priority to remedy this concern, and this is a partial response to this critique, but
tort claimants are not the only creditors who might be affected. Rasmussen, supra note 11,
at 64-66.
196.
See generallyLoPucki, supra note 10; Block-Leib, supra note 43.
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is to counteract the collective action problem inherent in state law debt collection.
Here it is not necessary to explain why certain parties would choose judicial
resolution of certain questions. Instead, it is merely necessary to explain why
society requires it. Under Posner's model, an open-ended rule gives the debtor the
ability to impose costs on a creditor who is not cooperating with the effort to
reorganize. The open-ended rule also gives that creditor the power to impose costs
on the debtor. Both parties' litigating behavior is constrained by cost. A creditor
stands to gain from seeking a lift stay because that will give it the ability to
foreclose on its collateral. However, the creditor must pay its own legal fees (not
to mention its pro rata share of the legal fees of the debtor if the creditor loses).
Similarly, the debtor, as a repeat player with multiple creditors, has a powerful
incentive to be viewed as a tough customer. Even where the judge is a wild card,
open-ended bankruptcy rules will help counteract the common pool problem
inherent in insolvency situations. Finally, when considering litigation expenses in
the social welfare balance, it is important to remember Carol Rose's point, that
mud has an effect both during litigation ex post and during negotiation ex ante,
Litigation expenses are incurred, however, only in those cases where a dispute
actually arises ex post. In the vast majority of cases that are not litigated, society
benefits from the disciplining effect of the muddy rule without suffering
deadweight litigation costs. Thus, the argument from social policy also explains
why open-ended rules aimed at non-cooperative behavior may be efficient.'97
a. Crystals and Mud in Consumer Bankruptcy
Does the same rationale work in consumer cases? In business bankruptcy
cases, the statute seeks to preserve going concern value by encouraging collective
decision-making by creditors. In most individual cases, this goal is irrelevant.
Nonetheless, there is a "Rawlsian" rationale for the consumer bankruptcy system
as well. First, the creditors (if placed in the original position, behind the veil of
ignorance) might choose equality of treatment over the first-in-time treatment of
state law. Not knowing in advance whether they are creditors who will be in a

position to monitor the debtor or not, they would choose instead the pro-rata
treatment accorded by the Bankruptcy Code. Second, these same creditors might
choose to be bound by the automatic stay in Chapter 13 in order to facilitate a
wage earner plan that will yield more than liquidation, in or out of bankruptcy.
Even the bankruptcy discharge can be justified this way. The parties
behind the veil of ignorance in the original position would include the debtor.
Therefore, a person behind the veil of ignorance would be uncertain as to whether
he or she would be a creditor or a debtor. As such, they might agree to a
bankruptcy discharge on the theory that the bankruptcy deal, under which the
debtor commits all non-exempt assets or all disposable income for three to five
years to the payment of creditors would yield virtually as much for creditors as a
world without the discharge, while alleviating the anxiety about the fact that he or
she might be the debtor, once the veil of ignorance is lifted.
197.

It does not, however, respond to the proceduralist "should not."
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Thus, Posner's cost-based view of the judicial system suggests a view of
bankruptcy law that can satisfy the proceduralist "should not" while offering a

response to the proceduralist "cannot." Even if judges cannot be relied on to
identify abusive or non-cooperative behavior, open-textured rules can still be used
as a mechanism to encourage cooperative behavior of creditors in an insolvency
situation.
D. Implicationsfor Legislatorsand Judges
1. Legislators

If muddy rules deter abuse whether or not the judge is competent,
legislators should allocate open-ended rules without regard to whether they view
the bankruptcy judge as competent or incompetent. If the goal of a statute is to
regulate behavior, muddy rules will accomplish this goal regardless of whether
judges can be relied on to decide cases correctly. This does not mean that the costbased approach does not have implications for legislators, however. Posner's
insight suggests that instead of focusing on a question of institutional empiricism
(are judges competent?), legislators should focus on a substantive empirical
question. To wit, does the open-ended rule identify an abuse that needs to be
deterred, and has the burden of litigation been allocated properly? In bankruptcy,
the legislator should ask, does increasing the cost of non-cooperative behavior
improve on the market operating without such a mandatory rule?
2. Judges

Posner does not assert that judges are incompetent, 93 nor does he argue
that incompetent judges are desirable. He acknowledges that competent judges are
better than incompetent ones.' He is merely controlling for judicial competence
in the institutional analysis. This, however, does not mean that Posner's analysis
does not have important implications for judges.
First, Posner assumes that judicial incompetence is even-handed, or as he
puts it, "normally distributed around" the mean.2 '"He assumes that errors are truly
random.2"' This assumption is crucial. If a judge is perceived as being
systematically favorable to creditors or debtors, this will give rise to strategic
behavior. Thus judges must take care not to appear to favor one side or the other
systemically. On one level, this injunction to impartiality seems obvious. On
another, it speaks to the debate over whether judges should adopt a mediative or
adjudicative stance. One of the risks of mediation by bankruptcy judges is that the
judge will drop hints about the likely disposition of the case. As such, a mediative
stance conveys information to the parties about the judge's possible biases. This is
problematic even ifjudges are competent because these judicial hints are based on
198.

See Posner, supra note 162, at 774.
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200.
201.

See id.
See id. at 762.
See id.
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predispositions which are formed without the benefit of a full factual presentation,
If there are doubts about the ability of judges, the hints dropped during mediation
may skew the results of the parties' bargaining.
Second, judges themselves do not assume their own incompetence. Does
the discussion above tell us anything about what judges should do when they seek
to adjudicate cases? Should they roll the dice (to ensure impartiality), or should
they try to belie Posner's lack of faith? Posner answers that the judges should give
it their best shot, "as long as judges are not perfectly incompetent but occasionally
right. Even if they are right only rarely, they can deter bad behavior by exerting
effort to discover whether the promisor breached or not,""
To put the answer another way, so long as increased judicial effort to "get
it right" is positively correlated with "getting it right," and does not instead merely
introduce bias, then the additional information provided by good judicial decisionmaking and good judicial reasoning will improve the efficiency of the system.
Third, and finally, in addition to concerning themselves with an
adjudicative posture and trying hard to "get it right," judges must avoid being
biased. A perceived pro-debtor or pro-creditor bias will skew the effect of a
muddy rule, not just in the cases that the judge actually decides, but also in the
cases that are negotiated in the shadow of a judicial decision. In this regard,
Baird's point about endowment effects and the lessons of cognitive psychology
are instructive. Bankruptcy judges need to recognize that rooting for one side or
another may impair the working of the system, that viewing success as a
confirmed plan of reorganization may actually undercut the salutary effect of
muddy rules on both creditor and debtors.
Thus, to the extent that the debate between proceduralists and
traditionalists turns on differing assessments of the ability of judges to identify
opportunistic or abusive behavior, or to identify businesses that are worth saving,
it would appear to be a red herring. To the extent that Congress identifies an abuse
that it wishes to control, then it makes sense to use muddy rules to confer that task
on judges, either because judges are good decision-makers or because of the
salutary effect that possible decision making, even by an incompetent judge, has
on the behavior of the parties. By contrast, to the extent that there are concerns
about judicial competence, this seems to reinforce the need to combat any actual
or perceived bias as well as the importance of an adjudicative rather than
mediative stance for bankruptcy judges.
V. PERILOUS CRYSTALS

At the beginning of this Article, I argued that bankruptcy reform and
modem bankruptcy scholarship were heading down a blind alley because of their
wrongheaded infatuation with crystalline statutory drafting driven by a
misunderstanding of the importance of empirical assessments of judicial
competence and statutory design. In this section, I offer a few examples of
202.

Id. at 774.
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wrongheaded crystals proposed in recent bankruptcy reform bills and by scholars.

One example will be drawn from proposed consumer bankruptcy reforms, two
will be drawn from the proposed business bankruptcy reform, and the final
example will be drawn from the literature on contract bankruptcy. One caveat is
important here. Notwithstanding their fascination with crystals, proceduralist
scholars do not necessarily approve of the statutory crystals discussed in this
section, and have been open in their criticism of means-testing in particular.!
A. Means Testing

Most of the discussion relating to the proposed bankruptcy amendments
has circled around the consumer bankruptcy reforms. The discussions have been
fueled by the politically powerful fact that in the year 2000, with the economy in
its eighth year of recovery, personal bankruptcy filings are above one million and
have been at that level for the last few years, notwithstanding the booming
economy." 4 Two explanations have been offered, and the proponents of each
explanation have proposed widely divergent approaches to bankruptcy reform.
One explanation is a decline in personal responsibility, the disappearance of the
stigma associated with bankruptcy, and a rise in the use of the Bankruptcy Code
by people who could in fact afford to repay their debts205 This explanation was
challenged by the National Bankruptcy Review Commission ("NBRC") and
others"' who offered instead a competing image of Americans deeply in debt
203.
In particular, Doug Baird has written an op-ed opposing means-testing, and
has testified against it in Congress. Alan Schwartz and Barry Adler have written a recent
law review article criticizing the means test. Barry Adler, Ben Polak & Alan Schwartz,
Regulating Consumer Bankruptcy: A Theoretical Inquiry, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 609
(2000) ("Reform proposals to make Chapter 13 mandatory seem ill advised because they
would eliminate much of bankruptcy's insurance function.").
204.
NAT'L BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, FINAL REPORT, 1 BANKRUPTCY: THE NEx-r
TWENTY YEARs 77 (1997) [hereinafter NBRC REPORT] ("For nearly 1.3 million American
families, the most important event of 1997 will be the public declaration that they are
bankrupt.").
205.
See Edith H. Jones & James I. Shepard, Recommendations for Reform of
Consumer Bankruptcy Law by Four Dissenting Commissioners, in NBRC REPORT, supra
note 204, at 2. This is the position taken by Judge Edith Jones and other members of the
National Bankruptcy Review Commission who dissented from the Commission's report.
See id.
206.
The NBRC REPORT states:
In 1981, two years after the 1978 Bankruptcy Code went into effect,
Americans who filed for bankruptcy listed in their schedules short-term,
non-mortgage debts that were, on average, slightly more than twice their
annual income....
The statistics suggest that the picture has not changed
appreciably since the early 1980s. Families filing for bankruptcy in 1997
apparently have incomes, assets, and debts little different from those of
their counterparts nearly two decades earlier when bankruptcy filing
rates were far less alarming.
NBRC REPORT, supra note 204, at 83. Studies cited by the NBRC for this proposition are
SULLIVAN E-TAL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS, supra note 148, at 75; Marianne B.
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because of increasing household debt loads, which in turn are a product of the
20 7
lending and marketing strategies of the consumer credit industry.
Notwithstanding the rising default rate, consumer lending has remained quite
profitable.2"8 However, the NBRC Report was not unanimous, and a vocal
minority filed a dissenting report.2°
The consumer bankruptcy reforms contained in the recent bankruptcy
bills have followed the approach of the dissenting report rather than that of the
majority of the NBRC. By far the most controversial of these proposed reforms is

the proposal to "means test" Chapter 7. Under this proposal, individual debtors
would be deprived of a discharge in Chapter 7 if they were deemed able to repay a
substantial portion of their debt. This proposal turns on the perception that abuse
of Chapter 7 is widespread.
Abuse of Chapter 7 arises in two related situations. In Chapter 7, a debtor
can obtain an immediate discharge of debts in return for selling all of his or her
non-exempt assets. By contrast, a debtor who wishes to protect assets must file a
Chapter 13 plan and commit substantially all of his or her income over three to
five years to the payment of creditors. When a high income/low asset debtor files a
Chapter 7 case, all future earnings are excluded from the estate. Creditors will
receive nothing out of the sale of assets, but the debtor will be able to continue to
live an extravagant lifestyle post-discharge. The paradigmatic case here is a high.
flying stockbroker who rents a $3000/month apartment in Manhattan (with leased
furniture and art), earns $200,000/year, and manages to live well beyond these
substantial means by eating in fancy restaurants, skiing in the Alps, drinking
expensive wine, and gambling in Monaco. Chapter 7 would allow this debtor to
discharge her debt and resume her extravagant lifestyle while paying creditors
virtually nothing. The second and even more extreme form of this abuse arises if
our stockbroker lives in Texas, Florida, or some other state with an unlimited
homestead exemption. In this case, our stockbroker doesn't even need to gamble
Culhane & Michaela M. White, Taking the New Consumer Bankruptcy Model for a Test
Drive: Means-Testing Real Chapter 7 Debtors, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 27 (1999);
Sullivan et al., Consumer Debtors Ten Years Later, supra note 148, at 142; and a study

compiled by Hon. Barbara Sellers, examining 1997 bankruptcy filings in the Southern
District of Ohio, which has not been published. A study, funded by the consumer credit
industry, -was also conducted in 1998 by Ernst & Young. That study is criticized in the
Creighton Study. See generally TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS:
AMERICANS INDEBT (2000) [hereinafter SULLIVAN ET"AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS].

207.
See Warren, supra note 148, at 1099. Warren notes, "The macrodata are
unambiguous about the best predictor for consumer bankruptcy. Consumer bankruptcy
filings rise and fall with the levels of consumer debt." Id. at 1081 (citation omitted). As she
sees it, "The profit margins of credit card issuers substantially increased beginning in 1982,
as a result of the functional deregulation of credit card interest rates coupled with prevalent

consumer behavior. This has created incentives for card issuers to relax their credit

standards, in turn leading to a secular increase in the rate of credit card defaults," Id. at
1083 (citation omitted); see generallySULLIVAN Er AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra
note 206.
208.
209.

See Warren, supra note 148, at 1099.
See note 216 infra.
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away her earnings; she can invest them in a well-appointed mansion on South
Padre Island.
The underlying insight is uncontroversial. No rational bankruptcy scheme
should encourage such behavior."' The question here is whether it should be
controlled through use of mud or crystals. Current law uses mud. Current
bankruptcy reform proposals would use an elaborate crystal.
Means testing has a long history as a strategy for curbing debtor abuse. In
1978, when Congress enacted the Code, "ability to pay" was considered as a basis

for dismissing a Chapter 7 case. The proposal was rejected. Instead, the Code
contains § 707(b) which states:
After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion or on a
motion by the United States Trustee, but not at the request or
suggestion of any party in interest, may dismiss a case filed by an
individual debtor under this chapter whose debts are primarily
consumer debts if it finds that the granting of relief would be a
substantialabuse of the provisions of this chapter. There shall be a
presumption in favor of granting the relief requested by the
debtor.2t
The report of the Senate Judiciary Committee states explicitly:
This section authorizes the court to dismiss a liquidation case only
for cause, such as unreasonable delay by the debtor that is
prejudicial to creditors or nonpayment of any [trustee's fees]. These
causes are not exhaustive, but merely illustrative. The section does
not contemplate, however, that the ability of the debtor to repay his
debts in whole or in part constitutes adequate cause for dismissal.
To permit dismissal on that ground would be to enact a non-uniform
2 2
mandatory chapter 13, in lieu of the remedy of bankruptcy.
Despite this legislative comment, most courts consider ability to pay as
one of a number of factors which may give rise to substantial abuse.22 3 Some
courts have gone further and used it as a sole criterion.2 t 4 The NBRC Report struck
an agnostic pose, saying:
210.
See, e.g., Michelle J. White, Why It Pays to File Bankruptcy: A CriticalLook
at the Incentives Under U.S. Bankruptcy Law and a Proposalfor Change, 65 U. CHI. L.
REv. 685 (1998) (advocating limitation of exemptions and merging Chapters 7 and 13).
211.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1994, Supp. IV 1998 & Supp. V 1999) (emphasis
added).
212.
S. REP. No. 95-989 (1977).
213.
See supra note 156.
214.
As the National Bankruptcy Review Commission noted:
Courts have divided over whether ability to pay some portion of one's
debts is substantial abuse of the Chapter 7 discharge. Some courts,
including the Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals, have held that
ability to pay a substantial percentage of debt out of future income is
grounds for dismissal of a Chapter 7 case. Under this type of approach,
some courts will find a Chapter 7 case to be substantial abuse only if the
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The Commission's Consumer Bankruptcy Working Group discussed
§ 707(b) but did not make a recommendation on the appropriate
interpretation or changes to that provision. The Commission's
endorsement of guidelines to replace the problematic disposable
income requirement was not intended to be applied to Chapter 7
debtors to be a proxy for substantial abuse, for this would stretch the
term "substantial abuse" beyond recognition. 13
This absence of a position on means testing prompted an angry dissenting report
from Judge Edith Jones and Commissioner James Shepard, which focused on the
abuse and also on the courts' non-uniform approach to the problem. 2'6
debtor could have paid 100% of debts in a reasonable period of time.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit took a slightly broader
approach, but ultimately determined that the debtor's ability to repay
may be sufficient to support a finding of substantial abuse. The debtor's
ability to pay would be a mandatory consideration, but other factors
could rebut whatever presumption of substantial abuse was created by
the debtor's apparent repayment ability. Taking a different course, the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that a Chapter 7
debtor's ability to repay a substantial percentage of debt, in itself, could
not support a finding of substantial abuse. Rather, substantial abuse must
be assessed on a case-by-case basis in view of the "totality of
circumstances" to see if the case is abusive overall. Under any of these
approaches, courts that review cases for repayment ability closely
scrutinize the details of the life and expenses of the debtor and related
parties, similar to the disposable income analysis. The inquiry is heavily
fact intensive and consumes substantial judicial resources when it arises.
NBRC REPORT, supra note 204, at 270-71 (citations omitted).
215.
Id. at 271-72.
216.
The dissenters state:
Chapter 7 is also not immune from a lack of uniformity. A review of
various judicial opinions concerning the application of the substantial
abuse dismissal power, I1 U.S.C. § 707(b), leads to no general
principles. Although the credit industry in 1974 had hoped that Congress
would pass legislation which would have required a debtor to file
Chapter 13 if he had sufficient income projected to fund a plan,
Congress rejected this proposal. Instead, Congress enacted § 707(b),
which permits a court to dismiss a Chapter 7 petitioner upon a finding of
substantial abuse. In spite of Congressional rejection of the "income
test", several courts have adopted such a test. See, e.g., In re Harris, 960
F.2d 74, 77 (8th Cir.) (rejecting an inquiry of "egregious behavior" on
the part of the debtor as a necessary condition for dismissal under
707(b)); In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908, 914-15 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting a
finding that a debtor can fund a Chapter 13 plan, alone will justify
granting a motion to dismiss under section 707(b)). Other courts have
taken a more equitable approach and investigated the "totality of
circumstances," not just the ability to fund a Chapter 13 plan. See, e.g.,
In re Green, 934 F.2d 568, 572 (4th Cir. 1991). The equitable approach
is arguably more consistent with the language of the statute. 11 U.S.C. §
707(b) ("There shall be a presumption in favor of granting the relief
required by the debtor.").
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Despite the non-position of the Commission, means testing Chapter 7
became a centerpiece of the bankruptcy reform legislation. In their 1999/2000
incarnation, the reform bills proposed in both the House and Senate contained a
means test. In both cases, there was a presumption that the debtor would be denied
a discharge in Chapter 7 if the family's disposable income, calculated based on the
IRS median income for the region, would allow the debtor to repay a substantial
portion of their outstanding debt. In the Senate Bill, a substantial portion was
defined as thirty percent, or S15,000. In the House Bill, the debtor would be

required to file a Chapter 13 if he or she would be able to repay S6000 over five
years.217
What is striking about the reforms contained in both bills is not that they
propose means testing, but instead that they go to great lengths to define precisely
the concept of ability to pay. The approach of S. 625 is remarkable in its bizarre
use of crystals to quantify a distinctly muddy form of abuse. The result is to create
a rule that is likely to accomplish virtually none of the stated goals of its drafters.
In most consumer cases, the burden of litigation will be dispositive. The
model of the judge in consumer bankruptcy suggests that consumer bankruptcy
rules that are intended to regulate behavior ought to state broad (if mud-like)
principles, but then take great care in determining how to allocate presumptions. If
the debtor has the burden of litigation, the debtor's own constrained resources will
preclude litigation. Similarly, if the creditor has the burden of litigation, the small
dollar amounts at stake will often mean that the game is not worth the candle. In
most cases, a debtor who must litigate his or her way into Chapter 7 will be denied
a Chapter 7 discharge altogether. Means testing increases the cost of going
bankrupt, and as a result, more troubled debtors simply won't have the money to
seek relief.
Thus, as in business bankruptcy, empirical instincts about the
paradigmatic case become crucial in allocating the litigation burden. If most
debtors are abusing the system, then the presumption should be against Chapter 7
relief. If most debtors are in trouble because of illness, loss of job, or other
unforeseen circumstances, then the presumption should be in favor of relief. The
approach followed in the current bill is to presume abuse whenever the debtor's
income exceeds IRS income and expense guidelines. Thus, if the debtor has
significant income, the burden shifts to the debtor to demonstrate that it cannot
repay its debts."' This approach is a significant change from current law, which

Jones & Shepard, supra note 205, at 67-68 n. 117, in NBRC REPORT supra note 204, at ch.
5.
217.
A competing bill, S. 945, sponsored by Senator Durbin, would have adopted
an approach closer to current cse law. Under § 102 of the Durbin Bill, the court would
have been allowed to deny a discharge if the debtor has an ability to pay, but leaves it up to
the judge to define ability to pay. Moreover, only the U.S. Trustee would have standing to
raise the issue if the debtor's income fell below the IRS medians. See S. 945, 106th Cong. §
102 (1999).
218.
In addition, if the U.S. Trustee brings a motion to convert to Chapter 13 or a
motion to dismiss and either is granted, and the debtor's position is found not to be
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presumes no abuse and grants a discharge unless a creditor objects, or unless the
219
judge or the U.S. Trustee argues that a discharge would be a substantial abuse.
Moreover, it appears that the presumption is being placed on the wrong side. To
the extent that there is empirical evidence, it suggests that very few debtors have
significant ability to repay their debts.220 In addition, the provision, as currently
drafted, is not backward looking. The debtor cannot rebut the presumption of
abuse by showing that the debts were the result of medical bills, job loss or other
non-culpable behavior. More importantly, this provision will require a substantial
reallocation ofjudicial time to determining eligibility for Chapter 7. In this regard,
the provision has all of the disadvantages of mud and none of its advantages, as
well as all of the disadvantages of a crystal and none of its advantages.
B. LimitingExtensions of Exclusivity

On the business bankruptcy side, a misguided crystal can be found in S.
625's prohibition on extensions of the debtor's exclusive period to file a plan
beyond eighteen months and its outside limit on exclusivity (whether or not a plan
has been confirmed) of twenty months. 2 ' This provision is a response to the
perception that some bankruptcy judges were using serial extensions of the
debtor's exclusive period as a way of stacking the deck in favor of reorganization,
sometimes for as long as four years. In 1993, Lynn LoPucki and William Whitford
examined forty-three bankruptcy cases of public companies and found that in
thirty-four of those cases, the judge left the exclusive period in place for the entire
case.' This may be evidence of a pro-debtor bias on the part of bankruptcy
judges, but it could also be evidence of creditor consent in most cases. To the
extent that this bias exists, it is problematic. However, the solution may not be to
enact a crystalline rule. To the extent that the purpose of the exclusive period is to
eliminate the incentive for creditors to hold out, this policy is furthered by the
current "muddy" nature of the judge's decision whether to extend the debtor's
exclusive right to propose a plan.

"substantially justified," the debtor's attorney will be liable for the trustee's attorneys' fees.
Section 102 of S. 625 provides in pertinent part:
The court shall order the counsel for the debtor to reimburse the panel
trustee for all reasonable costs in prosecuting a motion brought under
section 707(b), including reasonable attorneys' fees, if(I) a panel trustee appointed under section 586(a)(1) of title 28 brings a
motion for dismissal or conversion under this subsection; and
(11) the court(i) grants that motion; and
(ii) finds that the action of the counsel for the debtor in filing
under this chapter was not substantially justified.
S. 625, 106th Cong. § 102 (1999).
219.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1994, Supp. IV 1998 & Supp. V 1999).
220.
See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
221.
See S. 625, 106th Cong. § 413 (1999).
222.
LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 127, at 693, 717 n.177.
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In any event, this particular crystalline rule is highly problematic in that it
creates strong incentives for strategic behavior by creditors. Where the judge
cannot extend the exclusive period beyond a certain point, regardless of the reason
for the debtor's failure to confirm a plan (which might just as well be a product of
creditor recalcitrance as debtor delay), creditors who oppose the plan are given a
strong incentive to hold out until the twenty month period has expired. As such,
this provision may have unintended adverse consequences, precisely because of its
crystalline nature. A preferable strategy would be to require the judge to premise
any extension of exclusivity on a finding of creditor recalcitrance and a finding
that there is a likelihood of successful reorganization. This would leave the muddy
nature of the rule intact while guiding the judge in her exercise of discretion.
C Special Treatment of Security Interests in Aircraft and Rolling Stock

A second type of "crystal" originally proposed in the bankruptcy reform
bill, but separately enacted as section 744 of H.R_ 2000, is a provision that limits

the extent of the automatic stay for certain types of assets. The provision would
add §§ 110 and 1168 to the Bankruptcy Code, which would grant special
treatment to creditors whose collateral is airplanes, trucks, or trains,

For these

lenders, the automatic stay will last sixty days unless the debtor agrees to make
timely payments under the security agreement and cure any defaults. If the debtor
does not cure and perform its obligations, or if the creditor does not extend the
sixty day period, the creditor can repossess and sell the collateral pursuant to its
state law rights. This ability to insist on full performance of pre-petition
obligations, which has also been granted to non-residential real estate lessors,
among others, 4 is generally justified by arguing that a certain type of creditor is
particularly harmed by bankruptcy. The effect of the statute is to remove the
muddy lift-stay rules of the automatic stay and replace them with an automatic
lifting of the stay. This provision does not shift the burden of litigation around a
muddy rule (on the assumption that abuse is more likely on the debtor side than on
the creditor side). Instead, the provision lifts the automatic stay without giving the
judge the opportunity to determine which party is engaging in opportunistic
behavior.
One might come to the conclusion that this is a product of a legislative
determination that creditor overreaching is not a concern. However, there is also
reason to believe that many of these creditor-specific provisions are more a
product of effective lobbying than public-interested legislation. As Susan BlockLieb has pointed out, these provisions reflect a reappearance of the bankruptcy
common pool problem reasserting itself in the legislative arena. If every group
could organize in the legislature, the end result would be the piecemeal
evisceration of the automatic stay.' Indeed, it is possible to reconcile these two
views. The preferred position for airline lenders may work to the advantage of the
airline and the secured lender while harming non-adjusting and involuntary
223.
224.
225.

See S. 625, 106th Cong. § 401 (1999).
See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d) (1994).
See Block-Lieb, Congress' Temptation to Defect, supra note 6, at 850-51.
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creditors of the airline. If this is the case, then the crystalline nature of the rule
would appear to be a reflection of an interest group's attempt to lock in a
legislative gain and would have the effect of ratifying, indeed encouraging,
inefficient non-cooperative behavior."
D. Enforcing Waivers of the Automatic Stay

One crystal that is the darling of certain proceduralist scholars, but which
has not yet been incorporated into any proposed statute, is the recognition of
waivers of the automatic stay, discussed briefly above. 227 Remember, it is the
automatic stay that converts the crystalline rights of secured creditors to foreclose
under state law into the muddier entitlements to adequate protection and relief
from the automatic stay. Enforcement of pre-bankruptcy stay waivers would allow
creditors to opt for the crystalline state law remedies instead of the now mandatory
collective remedy of bankruptcy.
As noted above, the desire to enforce so called "bankruptcy contracts,"
turns in part on a deep suspicion ofjudicial ability to determine whether a business
reorganization effort is efficient or merely protective of incumbent management.
But it also turns on the view that if the secured creditor's loan terms up front
depend on its liquidation rights, the borrower should have the right to make
enforcement of that contract credible. It could be that only stupid borrowers would
make that contract, but it also could be an efficient contract. The question is an
empirical one, but the discussion above demonstrates that it is not sufficient for the
advocates of contract bankruptcy to state that judges are less able to value a
business than the market. Instead, the focus must be on whether pre-bankruptcy
stay waiver contracts are subject to "abuse" in the form of inefficient unilateral
behavior.
The analysis proceeds in two stages. First, as noted above, there are two
competing empirical instincts. On the one hand, in certain cases, stay waivers
might be efficient because they will make credit available to the debtor that would
not otherwise be available.228 On the other hand, stay waivers may create an
opportunity for subsidy from non-adjusting and involuntary creditors, and impair
the effectiveness of the automatic stay in stopping the race of diligence. If wo
"knew" which effect dominated, it would be appropriate to adopt a crystalline rule
stating either that all such stay waivers are prohibited or all such stay waivers are
226.
Whether or not this is the case turns on whether the negative externalities of
secured credit (harm to involuntary and non-adjusting creditors) outweigh the positive
externalities associated with additional credit availability. See Paul M. Shupack, Solving the
Puzzle ofSecured Transactions,41 RTrrGERs L. REv. 1067 (1989).

227.
See supra text accompanying note 188. Note, however, that section 912 of S.
420 raises many of the same issues. That section allows certain debtors to exclude assets
from the bankruptcy estate by conveying them to a so-called "Special Purpose Vehicle."
228.
Compare Schwarcz, supra note 49, at 565-71, with Elizabeth Warren,
Making Policy with Imperfect Information: The Article 9 Full Priority Debates, 82
CORNEL, L. REv. 1373 (1997). See also Lynn M. LoPucki, The Irrefutable Logic of
JudgmentProofing:A Reply to ProfessorSchwarcz, 52 STAN. L. REv. 55 (1999).
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permitted. However, we don't have any such knowledge.' The first step,
therefore, is to ask whether a muddy rule would be appropriate, i.e., if judges
could answer this question on a case by case basis. A judge could take both ex

post and ex ante effects into account, and therefore lift the automatic stay where
efficient, and enforce stay-waiver contracts where efficient. Muddy rules would
encourage efficient behavior, because parties would anticipate the results of
competent judging.
If, instead, we assume even-handed judges who do not have adequate
information or ability to make this decision, then a muddy rule may nonetheless be
desirable. A muddy rule will operate to increase the cost of non-cooperative
behavior, whether or not it is inefficient. Thus, muddy rules should be used where
there is a legislative judgment (hopefully based on an empirically correct instinct)
that unilateral behavior will tend, more often than not, to be inefficient. Thus,
muddy rules for stay waivers are appropriate if we believe (1) that the race of
diligence is more likely than not to be inefficient; and (2) that stay waivers, if
generally enforced, have the potential to simply begin the race of diligence at an
earlier point in time.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have argued that the combined effect of the proceduralist
"should not" and the proceduralist "cannot" do not mandate an unreflective shift
to crystalline rules in bankruptcy. Muddy rules that confer discretion on judges in
contexts where abusive or inefficient non-cooperative behavior raise the cost of
opting out of the bankruptcy case. This dynamic operates even where we have no
confidence that bankruptcy judges are capable of identifying abuse. Even where
judges have limited capacity, the costs of litigation associated with the opentextured rule will operate as an incentive to cooperate.
Moreover, this is not just true in the cases where the parties actually
litigate. It will also be true any time a party considers unilateral action. Thus, when

legislators and law reformers speak of eliminating statutory ambiguity or of

limiting judicial discretion, they should recognize that increased statutory
specificity may reduce the extent to which broad statutory policies are
incorporated into the behavior and thinking of the parties subject to statutory
regulation.

How then do we explain the proceduralist fascination with crystals if it is
not driven by the weak "should not" of Baird and Jackson, or even the "cannot" of
the new formalists?" 3 One answer may be that the weak version of the "should
not," justified in utilitarian terms, coupled with the "cannot," justified in the
neutral terms of cognitive psychology, are really sugar coating for, on the one
hand, a strongly normative libertarian view (as opposed to a welfare maximizing
view) on the part of some proceduralists, and, on the other hand, a harsher, less
politically palatable indictment of the bankruptcy judiciary which alleges bias
229.
230.

But see Schwarcz, supra note 49, at 574-75.
See supra note 97.
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rather than informational shortcomings. If this is the case, the proceduralists need
to recognize that the preference for crystals may not have a sound basis in theory
or in fact. Indeed, if they are alleging bias as a factual matter, this allegation needs
to be backed up by systematic factual inquiry.23 '
The lessons of this Article thus appear to be threefold. First, legislators
who are seeking to maximize social welfare should not assume that limitations of
the adversary process and of judges themselves suggest a wholesale limitation of
judicial discretion. Second, judges should recognize that in a world of uncertainty
and imperfect information, judicial even-handedness (and the perception of evenhandedness) is crucial and may be the quid pro quo for discretion.3 Third, and
finally, proceduralists need to think more systematically, and perhaps empirically,
about comparative institutional competence.

231.
Douglas Baird is currently engaged in an empirical study of the bankruptcy
judges in the Northern District of Illinois. It is important to note that Baird and Jackson's
comments about bankruptcy judges date back to the early 1980s, and rely on impressions of
bankruptcy referees formed under the Bankruptcy Act. It is possible that examination of
bankruptcy judges 20 years later may yield a different picture.
232.
This article has bracketed out, for the purposes of analysis, all norms other
than efficiency. As noted in footnote 143, there may be some redistributive provisions and
redistributive norms embodied in the statute itself. For example, the Timbers rule,
discussed supra, deprives the undersecured creditor of pendency interest. Where this is the
case, "even-handedness" or "impartiality" would require the judge to implement the
statutory norm rather than the norm of efficiency.

